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-rw-r--r--auth-options.c13
-rw-r--r--auth-rh-rsa.c11
-rw-r--r--auth-rhosts.c12
-rw-r--r--auth.c145
-rw-r--r--auth.h4
-rw-r--r--auth2-hostbased.c7
-rw-r--r--canohost.c262
-rw-r--r--canohost.h13
-rw-r--r--channels.c6
-rw-r--r--monitor.c5
-rw-r--r--monitor_wrap.c12
-rw-r--r--monitor_wrap.h10
-rw-r--r--opacket.h4
-rw-r--r--packet.c37
-rw-r--r--packet.h8
-rw-r--r--servconf.c11
-rw-r--r--serverloop.c12
-rw-r--r--session.c42
-rw-r--r--session.h4
-rw-r--r--ssh.c7
-rw-r--r--sshd.c120
21 files changed, 372 insertions, 373 deletions
diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
index edbaf80b..b399b91e 100644
--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.70 2015/12/10 17:08:40 mmcc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.71 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ match_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, char **optsp, const char *msg)
int
auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
const char *cp;
int i, r;
@@ -273,9 +275,9 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
}
cp = "from=\"";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
- const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
- const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname(
- options.use_dns);
+ const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(
+ ssh, options.use_dns);
char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
opts += strlen(cp);
@@ -457,6 +459,7 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
char **cert_forced_command,
int *cert_source_address_done)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char *command, *allowed;
const char *remote_ip;
char *name = NULL;
@@ -530,7 +533,7 @@ parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw,
free(allowed);
goto out;
}
- remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
result = addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
allowed);
free(allowed);
diff --git a/auth-rh-rsa.c b/auth-rh-rsa.c
index 2e20396e..057335ba 100644
--- a/auth-rh-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rh-rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.44 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.45 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@
extern ServerOptions options;
int
-auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, char *chost,
- Key *client_host_key)
+auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser,
+ const char *chost, Key *client_host_key)
{
HostStatus host_status;
@@ -68,7 +68,8 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, char *chost,
int
auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
{
- char *chost;
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ const char *chost;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s",
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key)
client_host_key->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
- chost = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+ chost = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost);
if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) {
diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
index ee9e827a..0ef34471 100644
--- a/auth-rhosts.c
+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.46 2014/12/23 22:42:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.47 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -30,14 +30,15 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include "packet.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h" /* XXX */
+#include "key.h" /* XXX */
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
-#include "key.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
@@ -189,10 +190,11 @@ check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
int
auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
- hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
- ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
}
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 214c2c70..aae0593e 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.113 2015/08/21 03:42:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.114 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ int auth_debug_init;
int
allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
u_int i;
@@ -182,8 +185,8 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
- hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
- ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
}
/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
@@ -274,6 +277,7 @@ void
auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
const char *method, const char *submethod)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
char *authmsg;
@@ -300,8 +304,8 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- get_remote_port(),
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1",
authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
@@ -331,12 +335,14 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
void
auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
"%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- get_remote_port(),
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1");
packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures");
/* NOTREACHED */
@@ -348,6 +354,8 @@ auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt)
int
auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
return 1;
@@ -364,7 +372,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(const char *method)
}
break;
}
- logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return 0;
}
@@ -604,6 +613,7 @@ auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
struct passwd *
getpwnamallow(const char *user)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
@@ -639,8 +649,8 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
}
#endif
if (pw == NULL) {
- logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
- user, get_remote_ipaddr());
+ logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
+ user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
record_failed_login(user,
get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
@@ -773,3 +783,118 @@ fakepw(void)
return (&fake);
}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+ * called.
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+ * attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
+ * XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
+ * XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
+ */
+
+static char *
+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+ char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+ const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+ /* Get IP address of client. */
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+ fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+ debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+ /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+ NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+ /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+ * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+ * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
+ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+ logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+ name, ntop);
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+
+ /* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+ lowercase(name);
+
+ /*
+ * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+ * address actually is an address of this host. This is
+ * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+ * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+ * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+ * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+ * the domain).
+ */
+ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+ hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+ hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+ if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+ logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+ "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+ /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+ if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+ sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+ (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+ freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+ /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+ if (ai == NULL) {
+ /* Address not found for the host name. */
+ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+ "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!",
+ ntop, name);
+ return strdup(ntop);
+ }
+ return strdup(name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+ * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+ * several times.
+ */
+
+const char *
+auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+{
+ static char *dnsname;
+
+ if (!use_dns)
+ return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ else if (dnsname != NULL)
+ return dnsname;
+ else {
+ dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ return dnsname;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index 2160154f..038b5929 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.86 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.87 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
+const char *auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int);
+
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *,
const char *, const char *);
diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
index e2327cf7..1b3c3b20 100644
--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.25 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.26 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
Key *key)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
HostStatus host_status;
int len;
@@ -168,8 +169,8 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
- resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
- ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+ ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__,
chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
index 223964ea..f71a0856 100644
--- a/canohost.c
+++ b/canohost.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.72 2015/03/01 15:44:40 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.73 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -35,147 +35,6 @@
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
-static void check_ip_options(int, char *);
-static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL;
-static int cached_port = -1;
-
-/*
- * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The
- * caller should free the returned string.
- */
-
-static char *
-get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns)
-{
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
- char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
-
- /* Get IP address of client. */
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- cleanup_exit(255);
- }
-
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET)
- check_ip_options(sock, ntop);
-
- ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
-
- if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
- fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
- NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
- fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed");
-
- if (!use_dns)
- return xstrdup(ntop);
-
- debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
- /* Map the IP address to a host name. */
- if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
- NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
- /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /*
- * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
- * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
- * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
- hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
- logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
- name, ntop);
- freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
-
- /* Names are stores in lowercase. */
- lowercase(name);
-
- /*
- * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
- * address actually is an address of this host. This is
- * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
- * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
- * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
- * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
- * the domain).
- */
- memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
- hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
- hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
- if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
- logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
- "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
- for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
- if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
- sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
- (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
- break;
- }
- freeaddrinfo(aitop);
- /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
- if (!ai) {
- /* Address not found for the host name. */
- logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
- "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!",
- ntop, name);
- return xstrdup(ntop);
- }
- return xstrdup(name);
-}
-
-/*
- * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
- * disconnect them if any are found). Basically we are worried about
- * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
- * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
- * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless
- * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
- * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
- * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
- * exit here if we detect any IP options.
- */
-/* IPv4 only */
-static void
-check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr)
-{
-#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
- u_char options[200];
- char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1];
- socklen_t option_size, i;
- int ipproto;
- struct protoent *ip;
-
- if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL)
- ipproto = ip->p_proto;
- else
- ipproto = IPPROTO_IP;
- option_size = sizeof(options);
- if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options,
- &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
- text[0] = '\0';
- for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
- snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
- " %2.2x", options[i]);
- fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s",
- ipaddr, text);
- }
-#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
-}
-
void
ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
{
@@ -202,38 +61,6 @@ ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
}
/*
- * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
- * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
- * several times.
- */
-
-const char *
-get_canonical_hostname(int use_dns)
-{
- char *host;
- static char *canonical_host_name = NULL;
- static char *remote_ip = NULL;
-
- /* Check if we have previously retrieved name with same option. */
- if (use_dns && canonical_host_name != NULL)
- return canonical_host_name;
- if (!use_dns && remote_ip != NULL)
- return remote_ip;
-
- /* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket())
- host = get_remote_hostname(packet_get_connection_in(), use_dns);
- else
- host = "UNKNOWN";
-
- if (use_dns)
- canonical_host_name = host;
- else
- remote_ip = host;
- return host;
-}
-
-/*
* Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string.
* The returned string must be freed.
*/
@@ -250,12 +77,10 @@ get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
if (remote) {
- if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
- < 0)
+ if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0)
return NULL;
} else {
- if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen)
- < 0)
+ if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0)
return NULL;
}
@@ -271,7 +96,7 @@ get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
/* Get the address in ascii. */
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
- error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed: %s",
+ error("%s: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", __func__,
flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r));
return NULL;
}
@@ -316,7 +141,8 @@ get_local_name(int fd)
/* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */
if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
- verbose("get_local_name: gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+ verbose("%s: gethostname: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ host = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
} else {
host = xstrdup(myname);
}
@@ -324,51 +150,9 @@ get_local_name(int fd)
return host;
}
-void
-clear_cached_addr(void)
-{
- free(canonical_host_ip);
- canonical_host_ip = NULL;
- cached_port = -1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
- * string must not be freed.
- */
-
-const char *
-get_remote_ipaddr(void)
-{
- /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
- if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) {
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- canonical_host_ip =
- get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
- if (canonical_host_ip == NULL)
- cleanup_exit(255);
- } else {
- /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */
- canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
- }
- }
- return canonical_host_ip;
-}
-
-const char *
-get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int use_dns)
-{
- static const char *remote = "";
- if (utmp_len > 0)
- remote = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns);
- if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len)
- remote = get_remote_ipaddr();
- return remote;
-}
-
/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */
-int
+static int
get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
{
struct sockaddr_storage from;
@@ -402,27 +186,11 @@ get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
/* Return port number. */
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
- fatal("get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s",
+ fatal("%s: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s", __func__,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
return atoi(strport);
}
-/* Returns remote/local port number for the current connection. */
-
-static int
-get_port(int local)
-{
- /*
- * If the connection is not a socket, return 65535. This is
- * intentionally chosen to be an unprivileged port number.
- */
- if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket())
- return 65535;
-
- /* Get socket and return the port number. */
- return get_sock_port(packet_get_connection_in(), local);
-}
-
int
get_peer_port(int sock)
{
@@ -430,17 +198,7 @@ get_peer_port(int sock)
}
int
-get_remote_port(void)
-{
- /* Cache to avoid getpeername() on a dead connection */
- if (cached_port == -1)
- cached_port = get_port(0);
-
- return cached_port;
-}
-
-int
-get_local_port(void)
+get_local_port(int sock)
{
- return get_port(1);
+ return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
}
diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
index 4c8636f4..26d62855 100644
--- a/canohost.h
+++ b/canohost.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.11 2009/05/27 06:31:25 andreas Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.12 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -12,18 +12,15 @@
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
-const char *get_canonical_hostname(int);
-const char *get_remote_ipaddr(void);
-const char *get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int, int);
+#ifndef _CANOHOST_H
+#define _CANOHOST_H
char *get_peer_ipaddr(int);
int get_peer_port(int);
char *get_local_ipaddr(int);
char *get_local_name(int);
+int get_local_port(int);
-int get_remote_port(void);
-int get_local_port(void);
-int get_sock_port(int, int);
-void clear_cached_addr(void);
+#endif /* _CANOHOST_H */
void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
index c9d2015e..7ee1f98d 100644
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.349 2016/02/05 13:28:19 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.350 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype)
{
char buf[1024];
char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock);
- int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_sock_port(c->sock, 1);
+ int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock);
char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
@@ -2935,7 +2935,7 @@ channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd,
if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 &&
allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
*allocated_listen_port == 0) {
- *allocated_listen_port = get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+ *allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock);
debug("Allocated listen port %d",
*allocated_listen_port);
}
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index ac7dd309..6b780e48 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.157 2016/02/15 23:32:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.158 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -1469,6 +1469,7 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
static void
mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
@@ -1490,7 +1491,7 @@ mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
}
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index c5db6df4..55200490 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.87 2016/01/14 16:17:40 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.88 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -378,15 +378,15 @@ mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt)
}
int
-mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host,
+mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user, const char *host,
Key *key)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0));
}
int
-mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user,
- char *host, Key *key)
+mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *user,
+ const char *host, Key *key)
{
int ret;
@@ -397,8 +397,8 @@ mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user,
}
int
-mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key,
- int pubkey_auth_attempt)
+mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
+ Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt)
{
Buffer m;
u_char *blob;
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index eb820aee..9fd02b30 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.29 2015/12/04 16:41:28 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.30 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
@@ -45,10 +45,12 @@ void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *);
char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *);
-int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *, int);
+int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, Key *, int);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int);
-int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
-int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *);
+int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, Key *);
+int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *,
+ const char *, Key *);
int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **);
int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *);
diff --git a/opacket.h b/opacket.h
index c26ade44..16322ec6 100644
--- a/opacket.h
+++ b/opacket.h
@@ -144,10 +144,6 @@ void packet_disconnect(const char *, ...)
ssh_packet_get_state(active_state, m)
#define packet_set_state(m) \
ssh_packet_set_state(active_state, m)
-#if 0
-#define get_remote_ipaddr() \
- ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state)
-#endif
#define packet_get_raw(lenp) \
sshpkt_ptr(active_state, lenp)
#define packet_get_ecpoint(c,p) \
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index f406c075..48111bb1 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.229 2016/02/17 22:20:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.230 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
(r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- free(ssh);
+ free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */
return NULL;
}
state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
@@ -379,6 +380,9 @@ ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+ if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
+ return 0;
+
/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
return 1;
@@ -468,10 +472,14 @@ ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) {
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
- ssh->remote_port = get_sock_port(sock, 0);
+ ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock);
+ ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
+ ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock);
} else {
ssh->remote_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
- ssh->remote_port = 0;
+ ssh->remote_port = 65535;
+ ssh->local_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
+ ssh->local_port = 65535;
}
}
return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
@@ -486,6 +494,27 @@ ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh)
return ssh->remote_port;
}
+/*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+ */
+
+const char *
+ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
+ return ssh->local_ipaddr;
+}
+
+/* Returns the port number of the local host. */
+
+int
+ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
+ return ssh->local_port;
+}
+
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
void
diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
index 28516a55..464d83b1 100644
--- a/packet.h
+++ b/packet.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.70 2016/02/08 10:57:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.71 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -56,9 +56,11 @@ struct ssh {
/* Key exchange */
struct kex *kex;
- /* cached remote ip address and port*/
+ /* cached local and remote ip addresses and ports */
char *remote_ipaddr;
int remote_port;
+ char *local_ipaddr;
+ int local_port;
/* Dispatcher table */
dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
@@ -145,6 +147,8 @@ int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
const char *ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *);
+const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *);
void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, time_t);
time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *);
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index b19d30e1..ba39dce1 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.285 2016/02/17 05:29:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.286 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@@ -706,14 +706,15 @@ process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options)
struct connection_info *
get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
static struct connection_info ci;
if (!populate)
return &ci;
- ci.host = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns);
- ci.address = get_remote_ipaddr();
- ci.laddress = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
- ci.lport = get_local_port();
+ ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
+ ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
+ ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
return &ci;
}
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
index e6a92476..f9e3e5d1 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.183 2016/03/04 03:35:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.184 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -395,6 +395,7 @@ wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
static void
process_input(fd_set *readset)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
int len;
char buf[16384];
@@ -402,8 +403,8 @@ process_input(fd_set *readset)
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
- verbose("Connection closed by %.100s",
- get_remote_ipaddr());
+ verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
connection_closed = 1;
if (compat20)
return;
@@ -412,8 +413,9 @@ process_input(fd_set *readset)
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
verbose("Read error from remote host "
- "%.100s: %.100s",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), strerror(errno));
+ "%.100s port %d: %.100s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh), strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
} else {
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 7a02500a..9a75c622 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.280 2016/02/16 03:37:48 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.281 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ do_pre_login(Session *s)
int
do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
int ret;
const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
char session_type[1024];
@@ -820,8 +821,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
s->pw->pw_name,
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- get_remote_port(),
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -856,6 +857,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
void
do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
@@ -878,7 +880,7 @@ do_login(Session *s, const char *command)
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
if (!use_privsep)
record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
+ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
@@ -1139,6 +1141,7 @@ copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
static char **
do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char buf[256];
u_int i, envsize;
char **env, *laddr;
@@ -1240,12 +1243,14 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell)
/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port());
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ ssh_local_port(ssh));
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in());
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), laddr, get_local_port());
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
free(laddr);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
@@ -1662,6 +1667,7 @@ child_close_fds(void)
void
do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
extern char **environ;
char **env;
char *argv[ARGV_MAX];
@@ -1738,14 +1744,14 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
/* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */
if (options.use_login)
- hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len,
+ hostname = session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
options.use_dns);
/*
* Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
* the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
* that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
* closed before building the environment, as we call
- * get_remote_ipaddr there.
+ * ssh_remote_ipaddr there.
*/
child_close_fds();
@@ -2498,12 +2504,13 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
void
session_close(Session *s)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
u_int i;
verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
s->pw->pw_name,
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- get_remote_port(),
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
@@ -2772,3 +2779,18 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt)
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2);
}
+
+/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
+
+const char *
+session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns)
+{
+ const char *remote = "";
+
+ if (utmp_size > 0)
+ remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
+ if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size)
+ remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ return remote;
+}
+
diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
index 6a2f35e4..f18eaf32 100644
--- a/session.h
+++ b/session.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.31 2013/10/14 21:20:52 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.32 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -81,4 +81,6 @@ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
const char *value);
+const char *session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int);
+
#endif
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index f9ff91f0..a999d507 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.436 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.437 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -513,6 +513,7 @@ set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, config_test = 0;
char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *host_arg, *logfile;
char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
@@ -1220,6 +1221,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
options.server_alive_count_max);
+ ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+
if (timeout_ms > 0)
debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
@@ -1346,7 +1349,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port());
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
} else {
verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host);
}
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 430569c4..d21aed51 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.465 2016/02/15 09:47:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.466 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -371,7 +371,8 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
}
/* Log error and exit. */
- sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state));
}
/*
@@ -407,7 +408,7 @@ key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
}
static void
-sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
+sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
u_int i;
int mismatch;
@@ -439,7 +440,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
strlen(server_version_string))
!= strlen(server_version_string)) {
- logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
+ logit("Could not write ident string to %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
@@ -447,8 +449,9 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
- logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
- get_remote_ipaddr());
+ logit("Did not receive identification string "
+ "from %s port %d",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (buf[i] == '\r') {
@@ -477,7 +480,7 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' "
"from %s port %d", client_version_string,
- get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port());
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
close(sock_in);
close(sock_out);
cleanup_exit(255);
@@ -485,23 +488,25 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
- active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
+ ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
- logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
+ logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ client_version_string);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
- logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
+ logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ client_version_string);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
"scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
}
- if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) {
+ if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) {
fatal("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; "
"refusing connection", remote_version);
}
@@ -546,8 +551,9 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
close(sock_in);
close(sock_out);
- logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s port %d: "
+ "%.200s vs. %.200s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
server_version_string, client_version_string);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
@@ -1452,6 +1458,47 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
}
}
+/*
+ * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
+ * return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
+ * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
+ * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
+ * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless
+ * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
+ * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
+ * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
+ * exit here if we detect any IP options.
+ */
+static void
+check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
+ int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+ socklen_t option_size, i, fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ u_char opts[200];
+ char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
+
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+ &fromlen) < 0)
+ return;
+ if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
+ return;
+ /* XXX IPv6 options? */
+
+ if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+ &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+ text[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+ " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+ fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+ }
+ return;
+#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+}
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
@@ -1459,6 +1506,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int r, opt, i, j, on = 1;
@@ -2118,28 +2166,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
*/
packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
packet_set_server();
+ ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
+ check_ip_options(ssh);
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
- debug("get_remote_port failed");
+ if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) {
+ debug("ssh_remote_port failed");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
- * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
- * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
- */
- (void) get_canonical_hostname(0);
- /*
* The rest of the code depends on the fact that
- * get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
+ * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
* the socket goes away.
*/
- remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
+ remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
@@ -2148,7 +2193,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
/* Log the connection. */
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d",
- remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port());
+ remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
free(laddr);
/*
@@ -2163,7 +2208,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (!debug_flag)
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
- sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
+ sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out);
/* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */
if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
@@ -2299,6 +2344,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
int
ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
int rsafail = 0;
if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
@@ -2307,9 +2353,9 @@ ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s: "
+ fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
"server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
@@ -2325,9 +2371,9 @@ ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
- fatal("do_connection: %s: "
+ fatal("do_connection: %s port %d: "
"host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
@@ -2348,6 +2394,7 @@ ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
static void
do_ssh1_kex(void)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
int i, len;
int rsafail = 0;
BIGNUM *session_key_int, *fake_key_int, *real_key_int;
@@ -2465,9 +2512,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
(void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
- error("do_ssh1_kex: bad session key len from %s: "
- "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
- get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
+ error("%s: bad session key len from %s port %d: "
+ "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", __func__,
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+ len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
rsafail++;
} else {
explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));