|firstname.lastname@example.org <email@example.com>||2016-09-28 16:33:06 +0000|
|committer||Damien Miller <firstname.lastname@example.org>||2016-09-29 03:11:32 +1000|
Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface. Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the required attack surface considerably larger. Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security check in the shared memory manager found by Stack (http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@ NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd for >10 years. Upstream-ID: 32af9771788d45a0779693b41d06ec199d849caf
Diffstat (limited to 'myproposal.h')
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
index 4729b30b..072e36ec 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.53 2016/09/22 17:52:53 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.54 2016/09/28 16:33:07 djm Exp $ */
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,email@example.com,zlib"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,firstname.lastname@example.org"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
#define KEX_CLIENT \