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authorBen Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org>2002-08-01 01:21:56 +0000
committerBen Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org>2002-08-01 01:21:56 +0000
commit3ed6640532ea53bc37182262141c9e917a448025 (patch)
tree88ad1d4bbb9cd865c154f24ad12feafd7e302ccd /hostfile.h
parent18d2b5d399a6ee97c65a058c14054fd2da2b891a (diff)
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/24 16:11:18
[hostfile.c hostfile.h sshconnect.c] print out all known keys for a host if we get a unknown host key, see discussion at http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=101069210100016&r=1&w=4 the ssharp mitm tool attacks users in a similar way, so i'd like to pointed out again: A MITM attack is always possible if the ssh client prints: The authenticity of host 'bla' can't be established. (protocol version 2 with pubkey authentication allows you to detect MITM attacks)
Diffstat (limited to 'hostfile.h')
-rw-r--r--hostfile.h6
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
index 0244fdb5..06373242 100644
--- a/hostfile.h
+++ b/hostfile.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.10 2001/12/18 10:04:21 jakob Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.11 2002/07/24 16:11:18 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -15,12 +15,14 @@
#define HOSTFILE_H
typedef enum {
- HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED
+ HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_FOUND,
} HostStatus;
int hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, Key *);
HostStatus
check_host_in_hostfile(const char *, const char *, Key *, Key *, int *);
int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *, Key *);
+int
+lookup_key_in_hostfile_by_type(const char *, const char *, int , Key *, int *);
#endif