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authorBen Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org>2001-01-19 04:26:52 +0000
committerBen Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org>2001-01-19 04:26:52 +0000
commitdb65e8fdedadaf79df2d8393a4d43e9094c80649 (patch)
treee5902db5ee2b69f9f3c2fa0dbdeb7f4fc20c68b4 /auth2-chall.c
parent5aa80596f76ce36dee4623a00a55548834c3328d (diff)
Please grep through the source and look for 'ISSUE' comments and verify
that I was able to get all the portable bits in the right location. As for the SKEY comment there is an email out to Markus as to how it should be resolved. Until then I just #ifdef SKEY/#endif out the whole block. - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 16:20:21 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c readconf.c servconf.c ssh.1 ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] log() is at pri=LOG_INFO, since LOG_NOTICE goes to /dev/console on many systems - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 16:59:59 [auth-passwd.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c serverloop.c session.c session.h sshconnect1.c] 1) removes fake skey from sshd, since this will be much harder with /usr/libexec/auth/login_XXX 2) share/unify code used in ssh-1 and ssh-2 authentication (server side) 3) make addition of BSD_AUTH and other challenge reponse methods easier. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/18 17:12:43 [auth-chall.c auth2-chall.c] rename *-skey.c *-chall.c since the files are not skey specific
Diffstat (limited to 'auth2-chall.c')
-rw-r--r--auth2-chall.c113
1 files changed, 113 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..77294f4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-chall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.1 2001/01/18 17:12:43 markus Exp $");
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+
+void send_userauth_into_request(Authctxt *authctxt, char *challenge, int echo);
+void input_userauth_info_response(int type, int plen, void *ctxt);
+
+/*
+ * try challenge-reponse, return -1 (= postponed) if we have to
+ * wait for the response.
+ */
+int
+auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs)
+{
+ char *challenge;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt, devs)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ send_userauth_into_request(authctxt, challenge, 0);
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
+ &input_userauth_info_response);
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void
+send_userauth_into_request(Authctxt *authctxt, char *challenge, int echo)
+{
+ int nprompts = 1;
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
+ /* name, instruction and language are unused */
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ packet_put_cstring("");
+ packet_put_int(nprompts);
+ packet_put_cstring(challenge);
+ packet_put_char(echo);
+ packet_send();
+ packet_write_wait();
+}
+
+void
+input_userauth_info_response(int type, int plen, void *ctxt)
+{
+ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ u_int nresp, rlen;
+ char *response, *method = "challenge-reponse";
+
+ if (authctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
+
+ authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */
+ nresp = packet_get_int();
+ if (nresp == 1) {
+ response = packet_get_string(&rlen);
+ packet_done();
+ if (strlen(response) == 0) {
+ /*
+ * if we received an empty response, resend challenge
+ * with echo enabled
+ */
+ char *challenge = get_challenge(authctxt, NULL);
+ if (challenge != NULL) {
+ send_userauth_into_request(authctxt,
+ challenge, 1);
+ authctxt->postponed = 1;
+ }
+ } else if (authctxt->valid) {
+ authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response);
+ memset(response, 'r', rlen);
+ }
+ xfree(response);
+ }
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, method, " ssh2");
+ if (!authctxt->postponed) {
+ /* unregister callback and send reply */
+ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
+ userauth_reply(authctxt, authenticated);
+ }
+}