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authorDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2010-08-31 22:41:14 +1000
committerDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2010-08-31 22:41:14 +1000
commiteb8b60e320cdade9f4c07e2abacfb92c52e01348 (patch)
tree4e5bc25790566402e5b7ae00cefd2c57e867ef09
parentda108ece6843f1268aa36d7c8ed0030dc53acd15 (diff)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c] [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c] [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h] [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c] Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric key length, as well as much shorter keys. Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented). Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported. Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be subject to change. feedback and ok markus@
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog23
-rw-r--r--PROTOCOL45
-rw-r--r--PROTOCOL.agent44
-rw-r--r--PROTOCOL.certkeys89
-rw-r--r--auth2-jpake.c7
-rw-r--r--authfd.c20
-rw-r--r--authfile.c32
-rw-r--r--bufec.c140
-rw-r--r--buffer.h9
-rw-r--r--dns.c3
-rw-r--r--kex.c10
-rw-r--r--kex.h16
-rw-r--r--kexecdh.c108
-rw-r--r--kexecdhc.c156
-rw-r--r--kexecdhs.c161
-rw-r--r--key.c541
-rw-r--r--key.h23
-rw-r--r--monitor.c3
-rw-r--r--monitor_wrap.c3
-rw-r--r--myproposal.h32
-rw-r--r--packet.c14
-rw-r--r--packet.h5
-rw-r--r--pathnames.h4
-rw-r--r--readconf.c8
-rw-r--r--ssh-add.113
-rw-r--r--ssh-add.c3
-rw-r--r--ssh-agent.111
-rw-r--r--ssh-agent.c60
-rw-r--r--ssh-ecdsa.c160
-rw-r--r--ssh-keygen.19
-rw-r--r--ssh-keygen.c40
-rw-r--r--ssh-keyscan.120
-rw-r--r--ssh-keyscan.c13
-rw-r--r--ssh-keysign.86
-rw-r--r--ssh.125
-rw-r--r--ssh.c27
-rw-r--r--ssh2.h6
-rw-r--r--ssh_config.523
-rw-r--r--sshconnect.c4
-rw-r--r--sshconnect2.c3
-rw-r--r--sshd.820
-rw-r--r--sshd.c7
-rw-r--r--sshd_config.512
-rw-r--r--uuencode.c4
-rw-r--r--uuencode.h4
45 files changed, 1793 insertions, 173 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index 2f4acd9d..889580e5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -25,6 +25,29 @@
* actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because
we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't
count on this to remain indefinitely.
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 11:54:45
+ [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys auth2-jpake.c authfd.c]
+ [authfile.c buffer.h dns.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h monitor.c]
+ [monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c packet.h pathnames.h readconf.c]
+ [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1 ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
+ [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h]
+ [ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
+ [uuencode.c uuencode.h bufec.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
+ Implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography modes for key exchange (ECDH) and
+ host/user keys (ECDSA) as specified by RFC5656. ECDH and ECDSA offer
+ better performance than plain DH and DSA at the same equivalent symmetric
+ key length, as well as much shorter keys.
+
+ Only the mandatory sections of RFC5656 are implemented, specifically the
+ three REQUIRED curves nistp256, nistp384 and nistp521 and only ECDH and
+ ECDSA. Point compression (optional in RFC5656 is NOT implemented).
+
+ Certificate host and user keys using the new ECDSA key types are supported.
+
+ Note that this code has not been tested for interoperability and may be
+ subject to change.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
20100827
- (dtucker) [contrib/redhat/sshd.init] Bug #1810: initlog is deprecated,
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
index 5fc31ead..5d2a7118 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@ are individually implemented as extensions described below.
The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
PROTOCOL.agent
-1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
+1. Transport protocol changes
+
+1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
@@ -20,7 +22,7 @@ in:
http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
-2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
+1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
@@ -31,14 +33,27 @@ The method is documented in:
http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
-3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com" and
- "ssh-dsa-cert-v00@openssh.com"
+1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com",
+ "ssh-dsa-cert-v00@openssh.com",
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
-OpenSSH introduces two new public key algorithms to support certificate
+OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
authentication for users and hostkeys. These methods are documented in
the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
-4. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
+
+OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
+specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
+curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
+generated.
+
+2. Connection protocol changes
+
+2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
@@ -77,8 +92,8 @@ message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message
upon request.
-5. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
- "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
+2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
+ "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
@@ -105,7 +120,7 @@ of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
whitelisted to receive this message upon request.
-6. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
+2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
@@ -166,7 +181,9 @@ The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
header.
-7. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
+3. SFTP protocol changes
+
+3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
@@ -179,7 +196,7 @@ SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
string targetpath
string linkpath
-8. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
+3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
@@ -200,7 +217,7 @@ ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
-9. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
+3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
@@ -217,7 +234,7 @@ rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
"1".
-10. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
+3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
"fstatvfs@openssh.com"
These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
@@ -258,4 +275,4 @@ The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.15 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.16 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent
index b34fcd31..de94d037 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL.agent
+++ b/PROTOCOL.agent
@@ -159,8 +159,8 @@ successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred.
2.2.3 Add protocol 2 key
-The OpenSSH agent supports DSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA keys may
-be added using the following request
+The OpenSSH agent supports DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA
+keys may be added using the following request
byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
@@ -182,6 +182,30 @@ DSA certificates may be added with:
string key_comment
constraint[] key_constraints
+ECDSA keys may be added using the following request
+
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521"
+ string ecdsa_curve_name
+ string ecdsa_public_key
+ mpint ecdsa_private
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
+ECDSA certificates may be added with:
+ byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
+ SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
+ string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+ string certificate
+ mpint ecdsa_private_key
+ string key_comment
+ constraint[] key_constraints
+
RSA keys may be added with this request:
byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
@@ -214,7 +238,7 @@ order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding
protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid
redundant processing.
-For both DSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be
+For DSA, ECDSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be
present if the request type is SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED.
The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been
@@ -294,8 +318,7 @@ Protocol 2 keys may be removed with the following request:
string key_blob
Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or
-"ssh-rsa".
+Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types.
The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key
and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will
@@ -364,8 +387,7 @@ Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as:
string key_comment
Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or
-"ssh-rsa".
+Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types.
2.6 Private key operations
@@ -429,9 +451,9 @@ a protocol 2 key:
uint32 flags
Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key
-Algorithms" for either of the supported key types: "ssh-dss" or
-"ssh-rsa". "flags" is a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value
-is defined (see below for its meaning):
+Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. "flags" is
+a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value is defined (see below
+for its meaning):
SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 1
@@ -535,4 +557,4 @@ Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys.
SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.5 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.6 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/PROTOCOL.certkeys
index 1d1be13d..2f976498 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL.certkeys
+++ b/PROTOCOL.certkeys
@@ -5,31 +5,37 @@ Background
----------
The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication
-mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the
-use of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some
-benefits relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation
-of attack surface, but it does not support the important use-cases
-of centrally managed, passwordless authentication and centrally
-certified host keys.
+mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use
+of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits
+relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack
+surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally
+managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys.
These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
-system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication.
-The certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with
-numerous options and complex encoding rules, but something rather
-more minimal: a key, some identity information and usage options
-that have been signed with some other trusted key.
+system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The
+certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous
+options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a
+key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed
+with some other trusted key.
A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
-keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism
-to allow specification of certification authority keys in addition
-to raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification
-of acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability
-to specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
+keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to
+allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to
+raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of
+acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to
+specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
-Certified keys are represented using two new key types:
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com that
-include certification information along with the public key that is used
-to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing operation.
+Certified keys are represented using new key types:
+
+ ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com
+
+These include certification information along with the public key
+that is used to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing
+operation.
Protocol extensions
-------------------
@@ -47,10 +53,9 @@ in RFC4252 section 7.
New public key formats
----------------------
-The ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com key
-types take a similar high-level format (note: data types and
-encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire encoding of
-these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
+The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data
+types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire
+encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER 1
#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2
@@ -93,6 +98,26 @@ DSA certificate
string signature key
string signature
+ECDSA certificate
+
+ string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384@openssh.com" |
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521@openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ string curve
+ string public_key
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
@@ -101,6 +126,9 @@ e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
+curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q"
+defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656.
+
serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this
@@ -123,7 +151,8 @@ any principal of the specified type. XXX DNS wildcards?
"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the
certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
- valid after <= current time < valid before
+
+ valid after <= current time < valid before
criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
@@ -137,15 +166,17 @@ The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
the protocol.
signature key contains the CA key used to sign the certificate.
-The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa and ssh-dss. "Chained"
+The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa, ssh-dss and the ECDSA types
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained"
certificates, where the signature key type is a certificate type itself
are NOT supported. Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to
-be signed by a DSS CA key and vice-versa.
+be signed by a DSS or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa.
signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string
up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
-(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss).
+(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA
+types).
Critical options
----------------
@@ -222,4 +253,4 @@ permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
of this script will not be permitted if
this option is not present.
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.7 2010/08/04 05:40:39 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.8 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
diff --git a/auth2-jpake.c b/auth2-jpake.c
index 5de5506a..a460e821 100644
--- a/auth2-jpake.c
+++ b/auth2-jpake.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.3 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.4 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -162,6 +162,11 @@ derive_rawsalt(const char *username, u_char *rawsalt, u_int len)
fatal("%s: DSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->dsa->priv_key);
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: ECDSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa));
+ break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, k->type);
}
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index 739722fb..ec537d2e 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.83 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.84 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -509,6 +509,19 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob));
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ buffer_put_cstring(b, key_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid));
+ buffer_put_ecpoint(b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa));
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa));
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
+ fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
+ buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob),
+ buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob));
+ buffer_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa));
+ break;
}
buffer_put_cstring(b, comment);
}
@@ -541,6 +554,8 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
type = constrained ?
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
@@ -589,7 +604,8 @@ ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key)
buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e);
buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n);
} else if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA ||
- key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+ key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA ||
+ key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ECDSA) {
key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen);
buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY);
buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen);
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index 2bd88784..865e7faf 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.82 2010/08/04 05:49:22 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.83 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -213,6 +213,10 @@ key_save_private_pem(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *_passphrase,
success = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(fp, key->dsa,
cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ success = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(fp, key->ecdsa,
+ cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
case KEY_RSA:
success = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(fp, key->rsa,
cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
@@ -231,6 +235,7 @@ key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
return key_save_private_rsa1(key, filename, passphrase,
comment);
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_RSA:
return key_save_private_pem(key, filename, passphrase,
comment);
@@ -510,6 +515,29 @@ key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
#endif
+ } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+ (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_ECDSA)) {
+ prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk);
+ prv->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ prv->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_group_to_nid(
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa));
+ if (key_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL) {
+ key_free(prv);
+ prv = NULL;
+ }
+ if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ key_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) {
+ error("%s: bad ECDSA key", __func__);
+ key_free(prv);
+ prv = NULL;
+ }
+ name = "dsa w/o comment";
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ if (prv->ecdsa != NULL)
+ key_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa);
+#endif
} else {
error("PEM_read_PrivateKey: mismatch or "
"unknown EVP_PKEY save_type %d", pk->save_type);
@@ -581,6 +609,7 @@ key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
commentp);
/* closes fd */
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_UNSPEC:
return key_load_private_pem(fd, type, passphrase, commentp);
@@ -721,6 +750,7 @@ key_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
break;
default:
error("%s: unsupported key type", __func__);
diff --git a/bufec.c b/bufec.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dff9c69c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bufec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.1 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Maximum supported EC GFp field length is 528 bits. SEC1 uncompressed
+ * encoding represents this as two bitstring points that should each
+ * be no longer than the field length, SEC1 specifies a 1 byte
+ * point type header.
+ * Being paranoid here may insulate us to parsing problems in
+ * EC_POINT_oct2point.
+ */
+#define BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN ((528*2 / 8) + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Append an EC_POINT to the buffer as a string containing a SEC1 encoded
+ * uncompressed point. Fortunately OpenSSL handles the gory details for us.
+ */
+int
+buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ u_char *buf = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* Determine length */
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
+ len = EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, bnctx);
+ if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) {
+ error("%s: giant EC point: len = %lu (max %u)",
+ __func__, (u_long)len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Convert */
+ buf = xmalloc(len);
+ if (EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ buf, len, bnctx) != len) {
+ error("%s: EC_POINT_point2oct length mismatch", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Append */
+ buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, len);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ bzero(buf, len);
+ xfree(buf);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ if (buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(buffer, curve, point) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
+int
+buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ u_char *buf;
+ u_int len;
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if ((buf = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: invalid point", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
+ if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) {
+ error("%s: EC_POINT too long: %u > max %u", __func__,
+ len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (len == 0) {
+ error("%s: EC_POINT buffer is empty", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (buf[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ error("%s: EC_POINT is in an incorrect form: "
+ "0x%02x (want 0x%02x)", __func__, buf[0],
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(curve, point, buf, len, bnctx) != 1) {
+ error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* EC_POINT_oct2point verifies that the point is on the curve for us */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ bzero(buf, len);
+ xfree(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve,
+ EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ if (buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(buffer, curve, point) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+}
+
diff --git a/buffer.h b/buffer.h
index 93baae2c..1fb3f166 100644
--- a/buffer.h
+++ b/buffer.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.20 2010/08/31 09:58:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.21 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -86,4 +86,11 @@ char *buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
void *buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *, u_int *);
int buffer_get_char_ret(char *, Buffer *);
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+
+int buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+void buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
+void buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
+
#endif /* BUFFER_H */
diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
index 2e7bb5aa..131cb3d8 100644
--- a/dns.c
+++ b/dns.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.26 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.27 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
case KEY_DSA:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA;
break;
+ /* XXX KEY_ECDSA */
default:
*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */
}
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index ca5aae3e..abe9b9f5 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.83 2010/08/31 09:58:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.84 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -325,6 +325,10 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
+ } else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_ECDH_SHA256,
+ sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1) == 0) {
+ k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2;
+ k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
#endif
} else
fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
@@ -559,11 +563,11 @@ derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus,
memset(&md, 0, sizeof(md));
}
-#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH)
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void
dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len)
{
- u_int i;
+ int i;
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 62fa2ea5..a183ffda 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.49 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.50 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <signal.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@
#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
#define KEX_RESUME "resume@appgate.com"
+/* The following represents the family of ECDH methods */
+#define KEX_ECDH_SHA256 "ecdh-sha2-"
#define COMP_NONE 0
#define COMP_ZLIB 1
@@ -67,6 +70,7 @@ enum kex_exchange {
KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+ KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
KEX_MAX
};
@@ -145,6 +149,8 @@ void kexdh_client(Kex *);
void kexdh_server(Kex *);
void kexgex_client(Kex *);
void kexgex_server(Kex *);
+void kexecdh_client(Kex *);
+void kexecdh_server(Kex *);
void
kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
@@ -153,11 +159,17 @@ void
kexgex_hash(const EVP_MD *, char *, char *, char *, int, char *,
int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *,
BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+void
+kex_ecdh_hash(const EVP_MD *, const EC_GROUP *, char *, char *, char *, int,
+ char *, int, u_char *, int, const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *,
+ const BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+int kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(const char *);
void
derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
-#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH)
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int);
#endif
diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a5a14f4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexecdh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.1 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(const char *kexname)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (strlen(kexname) < sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1)
+ fatal("%s: kexname too short \"%s\"", __func__, kexname);
+ ret = key_curve_name_to_nid(kexname + sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1);
+ if (ret == -1)
+ fatal("%s: unsupported curve negotiated \"%s\"", __func__,
+ kexname);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+kex_ecdh_hash(
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md,
+ const EC_GROUP *ec_group,
+ char *client_version_string,
+ char *server_version_string,
+ char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen,
+ char *skexinit, int skexinitlen,
+ u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen,
+ const EC_POINT *client_dh_pub,
+ const EC_POINT *server_dh_pub,
+ const BIGNUM *shared_secret,
+ u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ static u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string);
+
+ /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+ buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1);
+ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT);
+ buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen);
+
+ buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen);
+ buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, ec_group, client_dh_pub);
+ buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, ec_group, server_dh_pub);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&b, shared_secret);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ buffer_dump(&b);
+#endif
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b));
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, NULL);
+
+ buffer_free(&b);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+ dump_digest("hash", digest, EVP_MD_size(evp_md));
+#endif
+ *hash = digest;
+ *hashlen = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
+}
+
diff --git a/kexecdhc.c b/kexecdhc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f6d9977c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexecdhc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhc.c,v 1.1 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+void
+kexecdh_client(Kex *kex)
+{
+ EC_KEY *client_key;
+ EC_POINT *server_public;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret;
+ Key *server_host_key;
+ u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
+ u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+ int curve_nid;
+
+ curve_nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kex->name);
+ if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);
+
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
+ packet_put_ecpoint(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key));
+ packet_send();
+ debug("sending SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
+ key_dump_ec_key(client_key);
+#endif
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
+
+ /* hostkey */
+ server_host_key_blob = packet_get_string(&sbloblen);
+ server_host_key = key_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+ if (server_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot decode server_host_key_blob");
+ if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type)
+ fatal("type mismatch for decoded server_host_key_blob");
+ if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL)
+ fatal("cannot verify server_host_key");
+ if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key) == -1)
+ fatal("server_host_key verification failed");
+
+ /* Q_S, server public key */
+ if ((server_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: EC_POINT_new failed", __func__);
+ packet_get_ecpoint(group, server_public);
+
+ if (key_ec_validate_public(group, server_public) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid server public key", __func__);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("server public key:\n", stderr);
+ key_dump_ec_point(group, server_public);
+#endif
+
+ /* signed H */
+ signature = packet_get_string(&slen);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+ if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, server_public,
+ client_key, NULL) != (int)klen)
+ fatal("%s: ECDH_compute_key failed", __func__);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+#endif
+ if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+ xfree(kbuf);
+
+ /* calc and verify H */
+ kex_ecdh_hash(
+ kex->evp_md,
+ group,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key),
+ server_public,
+ shared_secret,
+ &hash, &hashlen
+ );
+ xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+ EC_POINT_clear_free(server_public);
+ EC_KEY_free(client_key);
+
+ if (key_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen) != 1)
+ fatal("key_verify failed for server_host_key");
+ key_free(server_host_key);
+ xfree(signature);
+
+ /* save session id */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ kex_finish(kex);
+}
diff --git a/kexecdhs.c b/kexecdhs.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d7333389
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexecdhs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdhs.c,v 1.1 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+void
+kexecdh_server(Kex *kex)
+{
+ EC_POINT *client_public;
+ EC_KEY *server_key;
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ BIGNUM *shared_secret;
+ Key *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
+ u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf, *hash;
+ u_int klen, slen, sbloblen, hashlen;
+ int curve_nid;
+
+ curve_nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kex->name);
+ if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("server private key:\n", stderr);
+ key_dump_ec_key(server_key);
+#endif
+
+ if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
+ kex->load_host_private_key == NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot load hostkey");
+ server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type);
+ if (server_host_public == NULL)
+ fatal("Unsupported hostkey type %d", kex->hostkey_type);
+ server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type);
+ if (server_host_private == NULL)
+ fatal("Missing private key for hostkey type %d",
+ kex->hostkey_type);
+
+ debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+ packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT);
+ if ((client_public = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: EC_POINT_new failed", __func__);
+ packet_get_ecpoint(group, client_public);
+ packet_check_eom();
+
+ if (key_ec_validate_public(group, client_public) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid client public key", __func__);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ fputs("client public key:\n", stderr);
+ key_dump_ec_point(group, client_public);
+#endif
+
+ /* Calculate shared_secret */
+ klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+ kbuf = xmalloc(klen);
+ if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, client_public,
+ server_key, NULL) != (int)klen)
+ fatal("%s: ECDH_compute_key failed", __func__);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+#endif
+ if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ if (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
+ memset(kbuf, 0, klen);
+ xfree(kbuf);
+
+ /* calc H */
+ key_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen);
+ kex_ecdh_hash(
+ kex->evp_md,
+ group,
+ kex->client_version_string,
+ kex->server_version_string,
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer),
+ buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my),
+ server_host_key_blob, sbloblen,
+ client_public,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key),
+ shared_secret,
+ &hash, &hashlen
+ );
+ EC_POINT_clear_free(client_public);
+
+ /* save session id := H */
+ if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
+ kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
+ kex->session_id = xmalloc(kex->session_id_len);
+ memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
+ }
+
+ /* sign H */
+ if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(server_host_private, &signature, &slen,
+ hash, hashlen)) < 0)
+ fatal("kexdh_server: key_sign failed");
+
+ /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
+
+ /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
+ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY);
+ packet_put_string(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen);
+ packet_put_ecpoint(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key));
+ packet_put_string(signature, slen);
+ packet_send();
+
+ xfree(signature);
+ xfree(server_host_key_blob);
+ /* have keys, free server key */
+ EC_KEY_free(server_key);
+
+ kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, shared_secret);
+ BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ kex_finish(kex);
+}
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index aed4678c..842280a9 100644
--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.91 2010/08/31 09:58:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.92 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* read_bignum():
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ key_new(int type)
DSA *dsa;
k = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k));
k->type = type;
+ k->ecdsa = NULL;
+ k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
k->dsa = NULL;
k->rsa = NULL;
k->cert = NULL;
@@ -109,6 +111,10 @@ key_new(int type)
fatal("key_new: BN_new failed");
k->dsa = dsa;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
+ break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
@@ -149,6 +155,10 @@ key_add_private(Key *k)
if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
+ break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
@@ -204,6 +214,12 @@ key_free(Key *k)
DSA_free(k->dsa);
k->dsa = NULL;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if (k->ecdsa != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa);
+ k->ecdsa = NULL;
+ break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
@@ -241,6 +257,8 @@ cert_compare(struct KeyCert *a, struct KeyCert *b)
int
key_equal_public(const Key *a, const Key *b)
{
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+
if (a == NULL || b == NULL ||
key_type_plain(a->type) != key_type_plain(b->type))
return 0;
@@ -261,6 +279,24 @@ key_equal_public(const Key *a, const Key *b)
BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 ||
+ EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) {
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ return 1;
default:
fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type);
}
@@ -312,12 +348,14 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length)
BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen);
break;
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_RSA:
key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len);
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* We want a fingerprint of the _key_ not of the cert */
otype = k->type;
@@ -612,7 +650,7 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
Key *k;
int success = -1;
char *cp, *space;
- int len, n, type;
+ int len, n, type, curve_nid = -1;
u_int bits;
u_char *blob;
@@ -644,9 +682,11 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
case KEY_UNSPEC:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
space = strchr(cp, ' ');
if (space == NULL) {
@@ -655,6 +695,11 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
}
*space = '\0';
type = key_type_from_name(cp);
+ if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ (curve_nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(cp)) == -1) {
+ debug("key_read: invalid curve");
+ return -1;
+ }
*space = ' ';
if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
debug3("key_read: missing keytype");
@@ -691,6 +736,12 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
key_free(k);
return -1;
}
+ if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA &&
+ curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
+ error("key_read: type mismatch: EC curve mismatch");
+ key_free(k);
+ return -1;
+ }
/*XXXX*/
if (key_is_cert(ret)) {
if (!key_is_cert(k)) {
@@ -721,6 +772,17 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8);
#endif
}
+ if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ECDSA) {
+ if (ret->ecdsa != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
+ ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
+ ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
+ k->ecdsa = NULL;
+ k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ key_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
+#endif
+ }
success = 1;
/*XXXX*/
key_free(k);
@@ -777,6 +839,11 @@ key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
if (key->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ if (key->ecdsa == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
@@ -810,6 +877,8 @@ key_type(const Key *k)
return "RSA";
case KEY_DSA:
return "DSA";
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return "ECDSA";
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
return "RSA-CERT-V00";
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
@@ -818,6 +887,8 @@ key_type(const Key *k)
return "RSA-CERT";
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return "DSA-CERT";
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ return "ECDSA-CERT";
}
return "unknown";
}
@@ -835,10 +906,10 @@ key_cert_type(const Key *k)
}
}
-const char *
-key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
+static const char *
+key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
{
- switch (k->type) {
+ switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
return "ssh-rsa";
case KEY_DSA:
@@ -851,10 +922,47 @@ key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
return "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com";
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+ return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256";
+ case NID_secp384r1:
+ return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384";
+ case NID_secp521r1:
+ return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521";
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ switch (nid) {
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+ return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+ case NID_secp384r1:
+ return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+ case NID_secp521r1:
+ return "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
}
return "ssh-unknown";
}
+const char *
+key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
+{
+ return key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+const char *
+key_ssh_name_plain(const Key *k)
+{
+ return key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(key_type_plain(k->type),
+ k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
u_int
key_size(const Key *k)
{
@@ -868,6 +976,19 @@ key_size(const Key *k)
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ switch (k->ecdsa_nid) {
+ case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+ return 256;
+ case NID_secp384r1:
+ return 384;
+ case NID_secp521r1:
+ return 521;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
}
return 0;
}
@@ -897,6 +1018,69 @@ dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits)
return private;
}
+int
+key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits)
+{
+ switch (bits) {
+ case 256:
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ case 384:
+ return NID_secp384r1;
+ case 521:
+ return NID_secp521r1;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is horrid, but OpenSSL's PEM_read_PrivateKey seems not to restore
+ * the EC_GROUP nid when loading a key...
+ */
+int
+key_ecdsa_group_to_nid(const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+ EC_GROUP *eg;
+ int nids[] = {
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+ NID_secp384r1,
+ NID_secp521r1,
+ -1
+ };
+ u_int i;
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new() failed", __func__);
+ for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) {
+ if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name failed",
+ __func__);
+ if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0) {
+ EC_GROUP_free(eg);
+ break;
+ }
+ EC_GROUP_free(eg);
+ }
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ debug3("%s: nid = %d", __func__, nids[i]);
+ return nids[i];
+}
+
+static EC_KEY*
+ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid)
+{
+ EC_KEY *private;
+
+ if ((*nid = key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: invalid key length", __func__);
+ if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__);
+ return private;
+}
+
Key *
key_generate(int type, u_int bits)
{
@@ -905,6 +1089,9 @@ key_generate(int type, u_int bits)
case KEY_DSA:
k->dsa = dsa_generate_private_key(bits);
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ k->ecdsa = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid);
+ break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA1:
k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits);
@@ -981,6 +1168,16 @@ key_from_private(const Key *k)
(BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL))
fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed");
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ n = key_new(k->type);
+ n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
+ if ((n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed", __func__);
+ break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
@@ -1012,6 +1209,11 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name)
return KEY_RSA;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
return KEY_DSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "ecdsa") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521") == 0) {
+ return KEY_ECDSA;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
return KEY_RSA_CERT_V00;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
@@ -1020,12 +1222,33 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name)
return KEY_RSA_CERT;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) {
return KEY_DSA_CERT;
- }
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+ return KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
+
debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
return KEY_UNSPEC;
}
int
+key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ if (strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+ return NID_secp384r1;
+ if (strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+ return NID_secp521r1;
+
+ debug2("%s: unknown/non-ECDSA key type '%s'", __func__, name);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int
key_names_valid2(const char *names)
{
char *s, *cp, *p;
@@ -1146,7 +1369,8 @@ cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
goto out;
}
if (key->cert->signature_key->type != KEY_RSA &&
- key->cert->signature_key->type != KEY_DSA) {
+ key->cert->signature_key->type != KEY_DSA &&
+ key->cert->signature_key->type != KEY_ECDSA) {
error("%s: Invalid signature key type %s (%d)", __func__,
key_type(key->cert->signature_key),
key->cert->signature_key->type);
@@ -1186,9 +1410,10 @@ Key *
key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
{
Buffer b;
- int rlen, type;
- char *ktype = NULL;
+ int rlen, type, nid = -1;
+ char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL;
Key *key = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *q = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
@@ -1201,6 +1426,8 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
}
type = key_type_from_name(ktype);
+ if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA)
+ nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype);
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
@@ -1238,6 +1465,41 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
#endif
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ key = key_new(type);
+ key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
+ if ((curve = buffer_get_string_ret(&b, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ error("key_from_blob: can't read ecdsa curve");
+ goto badkey;
+ }
+ if (key->ecdsa_nid != key_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
+ error("key_from_blob: ecdsa curve doesn't match type");
+ goto badkey;
+ }
+ if (key->ecdsa != NULL)
+ EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa);
+ if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid))
+ == NULL)
+ fatal("key_from_blob: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed");
+ if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_from_blob: EC_POINT_new failed");
+ if (buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(&b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
+ q) == -1) {
+ error("key_from_blob: can't read ecdsa key point");
+ goto badkey;
+ }
+ if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
+ q) != 0)
+ goto badkey;
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1)
+ fatal("key_from_blob: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed");
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ key_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q);
+#endif
+ break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
key = key_new(type);
break;
@@ -1255,6 +1517,10 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
out:
if (ktype != NULL)
xfree(ktype);
+ if (curve != NULL)
+ xfree(curve);
+ if (q != NULL)
+ EC_POINT_free(q);
buffer_free(&b);
return key;
}
@@ -1274,6 +1540,7 @@ key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* Use the existing blob */
buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob),
@@ -1286,6 +1553,12 @@ key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g);
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key);
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid));
+ buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa));
+ break;
case KEY_RSA:
buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(key));
buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e);
@@ -1319,6 +1592,9 @@ key_sign(
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
@@ -1347,6 +1623,9 @@ key_verify(
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
@@ -1366,7 +1645,9 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
pk = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pk));
pk->type = k->type;
pk->flags = k->flags;
+ pk->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
pk->dsa = NULL;
+ pk->ecdsa = NULL;
pk->rsa = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
@@ -1399,6 +1680,16 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
if ((pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ key_cert_copy(k, pk);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if ((pk->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(pk->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed");
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(pk->ecdsa,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1)
+ fatal("key_demote: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed");
+ break;
default:
fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
break;
@@ -1417,6 +1708,7 @@ key_is_cert(const Key *k)
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
@@ -1434,6 +1726,8 @@ key_type_plain(int type)
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return KEY_DSA;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ return KEY_ECDSA;
default:
return type;
}
@@ -1452,6 +1746,10 @@ key_to_certified(Key *k, int legacy)
k->cert = cert_new();
k->type = legacy ? KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_DSA_CERT;
return 0;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ k->cert = cert_new();
+ k->type = KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
+ return 0;
default:
error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
return -1;
@@ -1473,13 +1771,20 @@ key_drop_cert(Key *k)
cert_free(k->cert);
k->type = KEY_DSA;
return 0;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ cert_free(k->cert);
+ k->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ return 0;
default:
error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
return -1;
}
}
-/* Sign a KEY_RSA_CERT or KEY_DSA_CERT, (re-)generating the signed certblob */
+/*
+ * Sign a KEY_RSA_CERT, KEY_DSA_CERT or KEY_ECDSA_CERT, (re-)generating
+ * the signed certblob
+ */
int
key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
{
@@ -1498,7 +1803,8 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
return -1;
}
- if (ca->type != KEY_RSA && ca->type != KEY_DSA) {
+ if (ca->type != KEY_RSA && ca->type != KEY_DSA &&
+ ca->type != KEY_ECDSA) {
error("%s: CA key has unsupported type %s", __func__,
key_type(ca));
return -1;
@@ -1510,7 +1816,7 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, key_ssh_name(k));
/* -v01 certs put nonce first */
- if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+ if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k)) {
arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
}
@@ -1523,6 +1829,13 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->g);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->pub_key);
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob,
+ key_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid));
+ buffer_put_ecpoint(&k->cert->certblob,
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa));
+ break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->e);
@@ -1536,7 +1849,7 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
}
/* -v01 certs have a serial number next */
- if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT)
+ if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k))
buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->serial);
buffer_put_int(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->type);
@@ -1555,14 +1868,14 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical), buffer_len(&k->cert->critical));
/* -v01 certs have non-critical options here */
- if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+ if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k)) {
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob,
buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions),
buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions));
}
/* -v00 certs put the nonce at the end */
- if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00)
+ if (key_cert_is_legacy(k))
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, NULL, 0); /* reserved */
@@ -1647,3 +1960,201 @@ key_cert_is_legacy(Key *k)
return 0;
}
}
+
+int
+key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
+{
+ if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0)
+ return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0)
+ return NID_secp384r1;
+ else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0)
+ return NID_secp521r1;
+
+ debug("%s: unsupported EC curve name \"%.100s\"", __func__, name);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+const char *
+key_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
+{
+ if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1)
+ return "nistp256";
+ else if (nid == NID_secp384r1)
+ return "nistp384";
+ else if (nid == NID_secp521r1)
+ return "nistp521";
+
+ error("%s: unsupported EC curve nid %d", __func__, nid);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
+{
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ EC_POINT *nq = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
+ BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
+
+ /*
+ * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint()
+ * refuses to load GF2m points.
+ */
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+ error("%s: group is not a prime field", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Q != infinity */
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public)) {
+ error("%s: received degenerate public key (infinity)",
+ __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__);
+
+ /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_get_order failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public,
+ x, y, bnctx) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp", __func__);
+ if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) {
+ error("%s: public key x coordinate too small: "
+ "bits(x) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__,
+ BN_num_bits(x), BN_num_bits(order) / 2);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) {
+ error("%s: public key y coordinate too small: "
+ "bits(y) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__,
+ BN_num_bits(x), BN_num_bits(order) / 2);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */
+ if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_tmp failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_mul failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1) {
+ error("%s: received degenerate public key (nQ != infinity)",
+ __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one()))
+ fatal("%s: BN_sub failed", __func__);
+ if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0) {
+ error("%s: public key x coordinate >= group order - 1",
+ __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0) {
+ error("%s: public key y coordinate >= group order - 1",
+ __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ EC_POINT_free(nq);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ BIGNUM *order, *tmp;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
+ BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
+
+ if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
+ (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__);
+
+ /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_get_order failed", __func__);
+ if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <=
+ BN_num_bits(order) / 2) {
+ error("%s: private key too small: "
+ "bits(y) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__,
+ BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)),
+ BN_num_bits(order) / 2);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* private < order - 1 */
+ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one()))
+ fatal("%s: BN_sub failed", __func__);
+ if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0) {
+ error("%s: private key >= group order - 1", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK)
+void
+key_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ BIGNUM *x, *y;
+ BN_CTX *bnctx;
+
+ if (point == NULL) {
+ fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr);
+ return;
+ }
+ if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__);
+ BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
+ if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__);
+ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+ NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+ fatal("%s: group is not a prime field", __func__);
+ if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, bnctx) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp", __func__);
+ fputs("x=", stderr);
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
+ fputs("\ny=", stderr);
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
+ fputs("\n", stderr);
+ BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+}
+
+void
+key_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *exponent;
+
+ key_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key));
+ fputs("exponent=", stderr);
+ if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL)
+ fputs("(NULL)", stderr);
+ else
+ BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key));
+ fputs("\n", stderr);
+}
+#endif /* defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK) */
+
diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
index 11d30eae..2eb12436 100644
--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.30 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.31 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -29,14 +29,17 @@
#include "buffer.h"
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
typedef struct Key Key;
enum types {
KEY_RSA1,
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
+ KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_RSA_CERT,
KEY_DSA_CERT,
+ KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
KEY_UNSPEC
@@ -73,6 +76,8 @@ struct Key {
int flags;
RSA *rsa;
DSA *dsa;
+ int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */
+ EC_KEY *ecdsa;
struct KeyCert *cert;
};
@@ -104,9 +109,18 @@ int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
const char **);
int key_cert_is_legacy(Key *);
+int key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
+int key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
+const char * key_curve_nid_to_name(int);
+int key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
+int key_ecdsa_group_to_nid(const EC_GROUP *);
+int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
+
Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int);
int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *);
const char *key_ssh_name(const Key *);
+const char *key_ssh_name_plain(const Key *);
int key_names_valid2(const char *);
int key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
@@ -114,7 +128,14 @@ int key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_dss_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_dss_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
+int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int);
int ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int);
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK)
+void key_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+void key_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
+#endif
+
#endif
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 9eb4e35c..32395ee4 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.108 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.109 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -1691,6 +1691,7 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index faeb02cf..1a5dda56 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.69 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.70 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "schnorr.h"
#include "jpake.h"
+#include "uuencode.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
index 7bedfab0..71f90ee5 100644
--- a/myproposal.h
+++ b/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.25 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.26 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -32,20 +32,38 @@
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa," \
+ "ssh-dss"
#else
# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \
"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
-#endif
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
- "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
- "ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
+ "ssh-rsa," \
+ "ssh-dss"
+#endif
#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 49aa9733..a06c5e3e 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.169 2010/08/31 09:58:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.170 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -641,6 +641,12 @@ packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
buffer_put_bignum2(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value);
}
+void
+packet_put_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *curve, const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ buffer_put_ecpoint(&active_state->outgoing_packet, curve, point);
+}
+
/*
* Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set,
* encrypts the packet before sending.
@@ -1511,6 +1517,12 @@ packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value)
buffer_get_bignum2(&active_state->incoming_packet, value);
}
+void
+packet_get_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point)
+{
+ buffer_get_ecpoint(&active_state->incoming_packet, curve, point);
+}
+
void *
packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr)
{
diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
index fd0b056f..827561cd 100644
--- a/packet.h
+++ b/packet.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.53 2010/08/31 09:58:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.54 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <termios.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
void packet_set_connection(int, int);
void packet_set_timeout(int, int);
@@ -42,6 +43,7 @@ void packet_put_int(u_int value);
void packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value);
void packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
void packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
+void packet_put_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
void packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len);
void packet_put_cstring(const char *str);
void packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len);
@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ u_int packet_get_int(void);
u_int64_t packet_get_int64(void);
void packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value);
void packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value);
+void packet_get_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *);
void *packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr);
void *packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
char *packet_get_cstring(u_int *length_ptr);
diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
index 9e50950f..e2dd49a9 100644
--- a/pathnames.h
+++ b/pathnames.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.19 2010/02/11 20:37:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.20 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_config"
#define _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
#define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli"
/* Backwards compatibility */
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY ".ssh/identity"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA ".ssh/id_dsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA ".ssh/id_ecdsa"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA ".ssh/id_rsa"
/*
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 0296590e..98ce3017 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.187 2010/07/19 09:15:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.188 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1214,6 +1214,12 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
xmalloc(len);
snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++],
len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA);
+
+ len = 2 + strlen(_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA) + 1;
+ options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files] =
+ xmalloc(len);
+ snprintf(options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++],
+ len, "~/%.100s", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA);
}
}
if (options->escape_char == -1)
diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
index d7cc5310..3699db5e 100644
--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.52 2010/03/05 10:28:21 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.53 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" -*- nroff -*-
.\"
@@ -37,12 +37,12 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2010 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSH-ADD 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-add
-.Nd adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent
+.Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-add
.Op Fl cDdLlXx
@@ -54,11 +54,12 @@
.Fl e Ar pkcs11
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
-adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent,
+adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
When run without arguments, it adds the files
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
After loading a private key,
@@ -165,6 +166,8 @@ socket used to communicate with the agent.
Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.El
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
index 7f8fb2c6..31e61839 100644
--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.98 2010/08/16 04:06:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.99 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
static char *default_files[] = {
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY,
NULL
};
diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
index f65e8e62..88ad490b 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.50 2010/01/17 21:49:09 tedu Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.51 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 17 2010 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
-(RSA, DSA).
+(RSA, DSA, ECDSA).
The idea is that
.Nm
is started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and
@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ When executed without arguments,
.Xr ssh-add 1
adds the files
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/identity .
If the identity has a passphrase,
@@ -187,6 +188,8 @@ line terminates.
Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt
diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
index e6725ea8..fbfd79c1 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.168 2010/08/16 04:06:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.169 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -466,8 +466,10 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
Identity *id;
int type, success = 0, death = 0, confirm = 0;
- char *type_name, *comment;
+ char *type_name, *comment, *curve;
Key *k = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *exponent;
+ EC_POINT *q;
u_char *cert;
u_int len;
@@ -490,7 +492,6 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
case 2:
type_name = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
type = key_type_from_name(type_name);
- xfree(type_name);
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
k = key_new_private(type);
@@ -509,6 +510,57 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
key_add_private(k);
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->priv_key);
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ k = key_new_private(type);
+ k->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(type_name);
+ curve = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
+ if (k->ecdsa_nid != key_curve_name_to_nid(curve))
+ fatal("%s: curve names mismatch", __func__);
+ xfree(curve);
+ k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
+ if (k->ecdsa == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed",
+ __func__);
+ q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa));
+ if (q == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ buffer_get_ecpoint(&e->request,
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), q);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, exponent);
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(k->ecdsa, q) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed",
+ __func__);
+ if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed",
+ __func__);
+ if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: bad ECDSA public key", __func__);
+ if (key_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: bad ECDSA private key", __func__);
+ BN_clear_free(exponent);
+ EC_POINT_free(q);
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ cert = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &len);
+ if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
+ fatal("Certificate parse failed");
+ xfree(cert);
+ key_add_private(k);
+ if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, exponent);
+ if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1)
+ fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed",
+ __func__);
+ if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ key_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: bad ECDSA key", __func__);
+ BN_clear_free(exponent);
+ break;
case KEY_RSA:
k = key_new_private(type);
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->n);
@@ -534,9 +586,11 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->rsa->q);
break;
default:
+ xfree(type_name);
buffer_clear(&e->request);
goto send;
}
+ xfree(type_name);
break;
}
/* enable blinding */
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a1c1bdb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/* $OpenBSD */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "key.h"
+
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig;
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha256();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ u_int len, dlen;
+ Buffer b, bb;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ (key->type != KEY_ECDSA && key->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT)) {
+ error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+
+ sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa);
+ memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+
+ if (sig == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sign failed", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ buffer_init(&bb);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&bb, sig->r);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(&bb, sig->s);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name_plain(key));
+ buffer_put_string(&b, buffer_ptr(&bb), buffer_len(&bb));
+ buffer_free(&bb);
+ len = buffer_len(&b);
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (sigp != NULL) {
+ *sigp = xmalloc(len);
+ memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&b);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig;
+ const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha256();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md;
+ u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
+ u_int len, dlen;
+ int rlen, ret;
+ Buffer b, bb;
+
+ if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ (key->type != KEY_ECDSA && key->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT)) {
+ error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* fetch signature */
+ char *ktype;
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
+ ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(key_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
+ error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ xfree(ktype);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ xfree(ktype);
+ sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if (rlen != 0) {
+ error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen);
+ xfree(sigblob);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* parse signature */
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: ECDSA_SIG_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&bb);
+ buffer_append(&bb, sigblob, len);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&bb, sig->r);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&bb, sig->s);
+ if (buffer_len(&bb) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: remaining bytes in inner sigblob", __func__);
+
+ /* clean up */
+ memset(sigblob, 0, len);
+ xfree(sigblob);
+
+ /* hash the data */
+ EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
+ EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
+
+ ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa);
+ memset(digest, 'd', sizeof(digest));
+
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+
+ debug("%s: signature %s", __func__,
+ ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error");
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 9acd8f8c..4b95a4e1 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.98 2010/08/04 06:07:11 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.99 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" -*- nroff -*-
.\"
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 4 2010 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Nm
-can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1 and RSA or DSA
+can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1 and RSA, DSA or ECDSA
keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
The type of key to be generated is specified with the
.Fl t
@@ -142,9 +142,10 @@ See the
section for details.
.Pp
Normally each user wishing to use SSH
-with RSA or DSA authentication runs this once to create the authentication
+with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication
key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/identity ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 93f59800..44858518 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.199 2010/08/16 04:06:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.200 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
/* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */
#define DEFAULT_BITS 2048
#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 521
u_int32_t bits = 0;
/*
@@ -176,6 +177,10 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
case KEY_DSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA;
+ break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA:
@@ -260,6 +265,10 @@ do_convert_to_pkcs8(Key *k)
if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
}
@@ -280,6 +289,7 @@ do_convert_to_pem(Key *k)
fatal("PEM_write_DSAPublicKey failed");
break;
#endif
+ /* XXX ECDSA? */
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
}
@@ -539,6 +549,13 @@ do_convert_from_pkcs8(Key **k, int *private)
(*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
(*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey);
break;
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+ (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+ (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey);
+ (*k)->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_group_to_nid(
+ EC_KEY_get0_group((*k)->ecdsa));
+ break;
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type));
@@ -574,6 +591,7 @@ do_convert_from_pem(Key **k, int *private)
fclose(fp);
return;
}
+ /* XXX ECDSA */
#endif
fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__);
}
@@ -614,6 +632,10 @@ do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ break;
case KEY_RSA:
ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
@@ -1404,7 +1426,8 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid);
if ((public = key_load_public(tmp, &comment)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\"", __func__, tmp);
- if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA)
+ if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA &&
+ public->type != KEY_ECDSA)
fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
__func__, tmp, key_type(public));
@@ -2086,8 +2109,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name);
exit(1);
}
- if (bits == 0)
- bits = (type == KEY_DSA) ? DEFAULT_BITS_DSA : DEFAULT_BITS;
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ if (type == KEY_DSA)
+ bits = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA;
+ else if (type == KEY_ECDSA)
+ bits = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA;
+ else
+ bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
+ }
maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ?
OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
if (bits > maxbits) {
@@ -2096,6 +2125,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (type == KEY_DSA && bits != 1024)
fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits");
+ else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits) == -1)
+ fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length - valid lengths are "
+ "256, 384 or 521 bits");
if (!quiet)
printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name);
private = key_generate(type, bits);
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.1 b/ssh-keyscan.1
index 78255ff7..fe9bb6e0 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.1
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.28 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.29 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
.\"
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 9 2010 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -88,9 +88,10 @@ Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
The possible values are
.Dq rsa1
for protocol version 1 and
-.Dq rsa
+.Dq dsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa
or
-.Dq dsa
+.Dq rsa
for protocol version 2.
Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
The default is
@@ -122,7 +123,7 @@ attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus
.Ed
.Pp
-.Pa Output format for rsa and dsa keys:
+.Pa Output format for rsa, dsa and ecdsa keys:
.Bd -literal
host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
.Ed
@@ -130,9 +131,12 @@ host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key
Where
.Pa keytype
is either
-.Dq ssh-rsa
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
+.Dq ssh-dss
or
-.Dq ssh-dss .
+.Dq ssh-rsa .
.Pp
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
.Sh EXAMPLES
@@ -149,7 +153,7 @@ Find all hosts from the file
which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file
.Pa ssh_known_hosts :
.Bd -literal
-$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa -f ssh_hosts | \e
+$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa -f ssh_hosts | \e
sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
index b6cf427c..3fb1214e 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.82 2010/06/22 04:54:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.83 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
@@ -52,9 +52,10 @@ int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
-#define KT_RSA1 1
-#define KT_DSA 2
-#define KT_RSA 4
+#define KT_RSA1 1
+#define KT_DSA 2
+#define KT_RSA 4
+#define KT_ECDSA 8
int get_keytypes = KT_RSA; /* Get only RSA keys by default */
@@ -251,6 +252,7 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+ c->c_kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
c->c_kex->verify_host_key = hostjump;
if (!(j = setjmp(kexjmp))) {
@@ -673,6 +675,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
case KEY_DSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA;
+ break;
case KEY_RSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
break;
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
index 2e47f120..5e09e027 100644
--- a/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.11 2010/08/08 19:36:30 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.12 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 8 2010 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ Controls whether
is enabled.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
generate the digital signature.
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ Since they are readable only by root,
must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
information corresponding with the private keys above.
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 9b134f4b..a3d00115 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.309 2010/08/08 19:36:30 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 8 2010 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.310 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -269,13 +269,14 @@ should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's
private RSA key.
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
-RSA or DSA authentication is read.
+public key authentication is read.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
for protocol version 2.
Identity files may also be specified on
a per-host basis in the configuration file.
@@ -721,9 +722,9 @@ key pair for authentication purposes.
The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
.Nm
implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
-using either the RSA or DSA algorithms.
+using one of the DSA, ECDSA or RSA algorithms.
Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys,
-but protocol 2 may use either.
+but protocol 2 may use any.
The
.Sx HISTORY
section of
@@ -748,6 +749,8 @@ This stores the private key in
(protocol 1),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
(protocol 2 DSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+(protocol 2 ECDSA),
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
(protocol 2 RSA)
@@ -756,6 +759,8 @@ and stores the public key in
(protocol 1),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
(protocol 2 DSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+(protocol 2 ECDSA),
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
(protocol 2 RSA)
@@ -1277,7 +1282,8 @@ secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
+Lists the public keys (DSA/ECDSA/RSA) that can be used for logging in as
+this user.
The format of this file is described in the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page.
@@ -1298,6 +1304,7 @@ above.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the private key for authentication.
These files
@@ -1311,6 +1318,7 @@ sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the public key for authentication.
These files are not
@@ -1349,6 +1357,7 @@ The file format and configuration options are described in
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These three files contain the private parts of the host keys
and are used for host-based authentication.
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 44b570bf..1cdfc58e 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.348 2010/08/16 04:06:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.349 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0;
if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
options.hostbased_authentication) {
- sensitive_data.nkeys = 5;
+ sensitive_data.nkeys = 7;
sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
sizeof(Key));
@@ -789,25 +789,34 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
_PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_DSA,
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
- sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_RSA,
+ sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ECDSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_RSA,
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
- sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
+ sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
- sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
+ sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ECDSA,
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
PRIV_END;
if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 &&
sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL &&
- sensitive_data.keys[3] == NULL &&
- sensitive_data.keys[4] == NULL) {
+ sensitive_data.keys[4] == NULL &&
+ sensitive_data.keys[5] == NULL &&
+ sensitive_data.keys[6] == NULL) {
sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_cert(
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE);
sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_cert(
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE);
+ sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_cert(
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE);
- sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_public(
- _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_public(
+ _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_public(
+ _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
+ sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_public(
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1;
}
diff --git a/ssh2.h b/ssh2.h
index 3ffaf686..51a963ca 100644
--- a/ssh2.h
+++ b/ssh2.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.13 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.14 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -98,6 +98,10 @@
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY 33
#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST 34
+/* ecdh */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT 30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY 31
+
/* user authentication: generic */
#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST 50
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index ddb806ec..33038ffc 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.138 2010/08/04 05:37:01 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 4 2010 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.139 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -547,7 +547,15 @@ is similar to
Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms
that the client wants to use in order of preference.
The default for this option is:
-.Dq ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+ssh-rsa,ssh-dss
+.Ed
.It Cm HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
real host name when looking up or saving the host key
@@ -583,14 +591,15 @@ offers many different identities.
The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm IdentityFile
-Specifies a file from which the user's RSA or DSA authentication identity
-is read.
+Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA or DSA authentication
+identity is read.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/identity
for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
for protocol version 2.
Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
will be used for authentication.
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index f55beffe..4d3a0855 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.224 2010/04/16 21:14:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.225 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -1173,7 +1173,7 @@ show_key_from_file(const char *file, const char *host, int keytype)
static int
show_other_keys(const char *host, Key *key)
{
- int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, -1};
+ int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, -1};
int i, found = 0;
for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 4c379ae5..a31a663d 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.183 2010/04/26 22:28:24 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.184 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index bf9d6a2e..9d2efc7e 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.258 2010/08/08 19:36:30 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 8 2010 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.259 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -170,9 +170,10 @@ host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
for protocol version 2.
It is possible to have multiple host key files for
the different protocol versions and host key algorithms.
@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ though this can be changed via the
.Cm Protocol
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-Protocol 2 supports both RSA and DSA keys;
+Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys;
protocol 1 only supports RSA keys.
For both protocols,
each host has a host-specific key,
@@ -483,6 +484,9 @@ protocol version 1; the
comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
user to identify the key).
For protocol version 2 the keytype is
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
.Dq ssh-dss
or
.Dq ssh-rsa .
@@ -494,6 +498,7 @@ keys up to 16 kilobits.
You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
.Pa identity.pub ,
.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
+.Pa id_ecdsa.pub ,
or the
.Pa id_rsa.pub
file and edit it.
@@ -792,7 +797,8 @@ secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in as this user.
+Lists the public keys (DSA/ECDSA/RSA) that can be used for logging in
+as this user.
The format of this file is described above.
The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
@@ -871,6 +877,7 @@ rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These three files contain the private parts of the host keys.
These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
@@ -881,6 +888,7 @@ does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
These three files contain the public parts of the host keys.
These files should be world-readable but writable only by
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 52a3789b..658a4978 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.377 2010/08/16 04:06:06 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.378 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -733,6 +733,7 @@ list_hostkey_types(void)
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
p = key_ssh_name(key);
@@ -748,6 +749,7 @@ list_hostkey_types(void)
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
p = key_ssh_name(key);
@@ -774,6 +776,7 @@ get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int need_private)
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
break;
default:
@@ -1576,6 +1579,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
break;
}
@@ -2302,6 +2306,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 596a728f..af3d89b8 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.125 2010/06/30 07:28:34 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 30 2010 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.126 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: August 31 2010 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -470,9 +470,10 @@ used by SSH.
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
for protocol version 1, and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
and
-.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
for protocol version 2.
Note that
.Xr sshd 8
@@ -480,7 +481,8 @@ will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible.
It is possible to have multiple host key files.
.Dq rsa1
keys are used for version 1 and
-.Dq dsa
+.Dq dsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa
or
.Dq rsa
are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol.
diff --git a/uuencode.c b/uuencode.c
index b9e57e99..09d80d2f 100644
--- a/uuencode.c
+++ b/uuencode.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.25 2009/03/05 11:30:50 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.26 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
}
void
-dump_base64(FILE *fp, u_char *data, u_int len)
+dump_base64(FILE *fp, const u_char *data, u_int len)
{
char *buf;
int i, n;
diff --git a/uuencode.h b/uuencode.h
index fec55b49..4d988812 100644
--- a/uuencode.h
+++ b/uuencode.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.13 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.h,v 1.14 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -26,4 +26,4 @@
int uuencode(const u_char *, u_int, char *, size_t);
int uudecode(const char *, u_char *, size_t);
-void dump_base64(FILE *, u_char *, u_int);
+void dump_base64(FILE *, const u_char *, u_int);