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authorDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2002-03-13 12:47:54 +1100
committerDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2002-03-13 12:47:54 +1100
commit646e7cf3d7e7d4231c2d97d27c09fe5fe1d749e2 (patch)
treea693368c47d2d044514878fbb1516f87b487f78b
parent29bdd2c9bca2737e7a246ed50fd827a6ccba0c61 (diff)
Import of Niels Provos' 20020312 ssh-complete.diff
PAM, Cygwin and OSF SIA will not work for sure
-rw-r--r--Makefile.in6
-rw-r--r--auth.h4
-rw-r--r--auth1.c30
-rw-r--r--auth2.c119
-rw-r--r--bufaux.c2
-rw-r--r--cipher.c40
-rw-r--r--cipher.h2
-rw-r--r--compress.c4
-rw-r--r--kex.c4
-rw-r--r--kex.h1
-rw-r--r--kexdh.c13
-rw-r--r--kexgex.c19
-rw-r--r--key.c43
-rw-r--r--key.h1
-rw-r--r--monitor.c656
-rw-r--r--monitor.h57
-rw-r--r--monitor_fdpass.c89
-rw-r--r--monitor_fdpass.h32
-rw-r--r--monitor_mm.c329
-rw-r--r--monitor_mm.h64
-rw-r--r--monitor_wrap.c538
-rw-r--r--monitor_wrap.h99
-rw-r--r--packet.c106
-rw-r--r--packet.h7
-rw-r--r--servconf.c15
-rw-r--r--session.c53
-rw-r--r--session.h28
-rw-r--r--sshd.c173
28 files changed, 2425 insertions, 109 deletions
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index b58250aa..38c1d381 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.197 2002/02/26 19:24:22 mouring Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.198 2002/03/13 01:47:54 djm Exp $
prefix=@prefix@
exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
@@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER@
TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) ssh-rand-helper${EXEEXT} $(SFTP_PROGS)
-LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dh.o dispatch.o fatal.o mac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o log.o match.o misc.o mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o rijndael.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o scard.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o
+LIBSSH_OBJS=atomicio.o authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o buffer.o canohost.o channels.o cipher.o compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o dh.o dispatch.o fatal.o mac.o hostfile.o key.o kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o log.o match.o misc.o monitor_fdpass.c monitor_wrap.c mpaux.o nchan.o packet.o radix.o rijndael.o entropy.o readpass.o rsa.o scard.o ssh-dss.o ssh-rsa.o tildexpand.o ttymodes.o uidswap.o uuencode.o xmalloc.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o sshtty.o readconf.o clientloop.o
-SSHDOBJS= sshd.o auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o auth-rhosts.o auth-options.o auth-krb4.o auth-pam.o auth2-pam.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o auth-sia.o sshpty.o sshlogin.o loginrec.o servconf.o serverloop.o md5crypt.o session.o groupaccess.o auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o
+SSHDOBJS= sshd.o auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o auth-rhosts.o auth-options.o auth-krb4.o auth-pam.o auth2-pam.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o auth-sia.o monitor.c monitor_mm.c sshpty.o sshlogin.o loginrec.o servconf.o serverloop.o md5crypt.o session.o groupaccess.o auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o
MANPAGES = scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out
MANPAGES_IN = scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
index c7175405..9b5b19f6 100644
--- a/auth.h
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ void krb5_cleanup_proc(void *authctxt);
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "auth2-pam.h"
-void do_authentication(void);
-void do_authentication2(void);
+Authctxt *do_authentication(void);
+Authctxt *do_authentication2(void);
Authctxt *authctxt_new(void);
void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, char *, char *);
diff --git a/auth1.c b/auth1.c
index c2d99895..c52f6389 100644
--- a/auth1.c
+++ b/auth1.c
@@ -26,8 +26,13 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.35 2002/02/03 17:53:25 markus Exp $");
#include "session.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
/* import */
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern int mm_recvfd;
+
extern ServerOptions options;
/*
@@ -355,12 +360,13 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
* Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already
* been exchanged and encryption is enabled.
*/
-void
+Authctxt *
do_authentication(void)
{
Authctxt *authctxt;
- struct passwd *pw;
+ struct passwd *pw = NULL, *pwent;
u_int ulen;
+ int allowed;
char *p, *user, *style = NULL;
/* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */
@@ -382,17 +388,26 @@ do_authentication(void)
authctxt->style = style;
/* Verify that the user is a valid user. */
- pw = getpwnam(user);
- if (pw && allowed_user(pw)) {
+ if (!use_privsep) {
+ pwent = getpwnam(user);
+ allowed = pwent ? allowed_user(pwent) : 0;
+ } else
+ pwent = mm_getpwnamallow(mm_recvfd, user, &allowed);
+ if (pwent && allowed) {
authctxt->valid = 1;
- pw = pwcopy(pw);
+ pw = pwcopy(pwent);
} else {
debug("do_authentication: illegal user %s", user);
pw = NULL;
}
+ /* Free memory */
+ if (use_privsep)
+ pwfree(pwent);
+
authctxt->pw = pw;
- setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown");
+ setproctitle("%s%s", use_privsep ? " [net]" : "",
+ pw ? user : "unknown");
#ifdef USE_PAM
start_pam(pw == NULL ? "NOUSER" : user);
@@ -418,6 +433,5 @@ do_authentication(void)
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
- /* Perform session preparation. */
- do_authenticated(authctxt);
+ return (authctxt);
}
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
index f2a801ec..f661f8d7 100644
--- a/auth2.c
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -51,8 +51,13 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.85 2002/02/24 19:14:59 markus Exp $");
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "match.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
/* import */
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern int mm_recvfd;
+
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern int session_id2_len;
@@ -75,8 +80,8 @@ static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *);
/* helper */
static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *);
static char *authmethods_get(void);
-static int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
-static int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
+int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
/* auth */
static void userauth_banner(void);
@@ -109,7 +114,7 @@ Authmethod authmethods[] = {
* loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
*/
-void
+Authctxt *
do_authentication2(void)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = authctxt_new();
@@ -125,7 +130,8 @@ do_authentication2(void)
dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error);
dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt);
- do_authenticated(authctxt);
+
+ return(authctxt);
}
static void
@@ -182,10 +188,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
*style++ = 0;
if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
- /* setup auth context */
+ /* setup auth context */
+ int allowed;
struct passwd *pw = NULL;
- pw = getpwnam(user);
- if (pw && allowed_user(pw) && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
+ if (!use_privsep) {
+ pw = getpwnam(user);
+ allowed = pw ? allowed_user(pw) : 0;
+ } else
+ pw = mm_getpwnamallow(mm_recvfd, user, &allowed);
+ if (pw && allowed && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pw);
authctxt->valid = 1;
debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user);
@@ -198,10 +209,18 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
start_pam("NOUSER");
#endif
}
- setproctitle("%s", pw ? user : "unknown");
+ /* Free memory */
+ if (use_privsep)
+ pwfree(pw);
+
+ setproctitle("%s%s", use_privsep ? " [net]" : "",
+ pw ? user : "unknown");
authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_inform_authserv(mm_recvfd, service, style);
} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: "
@@ -313,6 +332,8 @@ done:
static int
userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
+ int res = 0;
+
/* disable method "none", only allowed one time */
Authmethod *m = authmethod_lookup("none");
if (m != NULL)
@@ -322,18 +343,16 @@ userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
if (authctxt->valid == 0)
return(0);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- if (check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw) == 0)
- return(0);
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ return (0);
+ if (use_privsep)
+#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+#error NOT IMPLEMENTED FOR PRIVSEP
#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- return auth_pam_password(authctxt->pw, "");
-#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
- return 0;
-#else /* !HAVE_OSF_SIA && !USE_PAM */
- return auth_password(authctxt, "");
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
+ res = mm_auth_password(mm_recvfd, "");
+ else
+ res = auth_password(authctxt, "");
+ return (res);
}
static int
@@ -348,18 +367,16 @@ userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt)
log("password change not supported");
password = packet_get_string(&len);
packet_check_eom();
- if (authctxt->valid &&
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- check_nt_auth(1, authctxt->pw) &&
+
+#if defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) || defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
+#error NOT IMPLEMENTED FOR PRIVSEP
#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- auth_pam_password(authctxt->pw, password) == 1)
-#elif defined(HAVE_OSF_SIA)
- auth_sia_password(authctxt->user, password) == 1)
-#else /* !USE_PAM && !HAVE_OSF_SIA */
- auth_password(authctxt, password) == 1)
-#endif /* USE_PAM */
- authenticated = 1;
+ if (authctxt->valid) {
+ if (use_privsep)
+ authenticated = mm_auth_password(mm_recvfd, password);
+ else
+ authenticated = auth_password(authctxt, password);
+ }
memset(password, 0, len);
xfree(password);
return authenticated;
@@ -467,12 +484,23 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
- if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key) &&
- key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
- authenticated = 1;
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ if (mm_user_key_allowed(mm_recvfd, key) &&
+ mm_key_verify(mm_recvfd,
+ MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key, sig, slen,
+ buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key) &&
+ key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+ }
buffer_clear(&b);
xfree(sig);
} else {
+ int res = 0;
debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable");
packet_check_eom();
@@ -484,7 +512,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
- if (user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) {
+ if (use_privsep)
+ res = mm_user_key_allowed(mm_recvfd, key);
+ else
+ res = user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+ if (res) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK);
packet_put_string(pkalg, alen);
packet_put_string(pkblob, blen);
@@ -572,9 +604,18 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt)
buffer_dump(&b);
#endif
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
- if (hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key) &&
- key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
- authenticated = 1;
+ authenticated = 0;
+ if (use_privsep) {
+ if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(mm_recvfd, cuser, chost, key) &&
+ mm_key_verify(mm_recvfd, MM_HOSTKEY, cuser, chost, key,
+ sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+ } else {
+ if (hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key) &&
+ key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b),
+ buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
+ authenticated = 1;
+ }
buffer_clear(&b);
done:
@@ -730,7 +771,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
}
/* check whether given key is in .ssh/authorized_keys* */
-static int
+int
user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
{
int success;
@@ -750,7 +791,7 @@ user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
}
/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
-static int
+int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
Key *key)
{
diff --git a/bufaux.c b/bufaux.c
index 23bc0c81..64b9a26e 100644
--- a/bufaux.c
+++ b/bufaux.c
@@ -221,6 +221,8 @@ buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len)
void
buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s)
{
+ if (s == NULL)
+ fatal("buffer_put_cstring: s == NULL");
buffer_put_string(buffer, s, strlen(s));
}
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index 9e8f42f5..5ddf819c 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -541,3 +541,43 @@ evp_rijndael(void)
#endif
return (&rijndal_cbc);
}
+
+/*
+ * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
+ * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
+ * process.
+ */
+
+void
+cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len)
+{
+ Cipher *c = cc->cipher;
+ u_char *civ = NULL;
+ int evplen;
+
+ switch (c->number) {
+ case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2:
+ evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp);
+ if (evplen == 0)
+ return;
+ if (evplen != len)
+ fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __FUNCTION__,
+ evplen, len);
+
+ if (strncmp(c->name, "aes", 3) == 0) {
+ struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *aesc;
+
+ aesc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(&cc->evp);
+ if (aesc == NULL)
+ fatal("ssh_rijndael_cbc: no context");
+ civ = aesc->r_iv;
+ } else {
+ civ = cc->evp.iv;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __FUNCTION__, c->number);
+ }
+ memcpy(iv, civ, len);
+}
+
diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
index b3b0303c..c7724469 100644
--- a/cipher.h
+++ b/cipher.h
@@ -81,4 +81,6 @@ void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *);
void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, Cipher *, const char *, int);
u_int cipher_blocksize(Cipher *);
u_int cipher_keylen(Cipher *);
+
+void cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *, u_int);
#endif /* CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/compress.c b/compress.c
index 3badbf45..dec96ba5 100644
--- a/compress.c
+++ b/compress.c
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: compress.c,v 1.17 2001/12/29 21:56:01 stevesk Exp $");
#include "zlib.h"
#include "compress.h"
-static z_stream incoming_stream;
-static z_stream outgoing_stream;
+z_stream incoming_stream;
+z_stream outgoing_stream;
static int compress_init_send_called = 0;
static int compress_init_recv_called = 0;
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index bf8fd95b..e5c0b0d0 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.47 2002/02/28 15:46:33 markus Exp $");
#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16
+/* Use privilege separation for sshd */
+int use_privsep;
+int mm_recvfd;
+
/* prototype */
static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *);
static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *);
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 755bf332..c99afaec 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ struct Kex {
char *server_version_string;
int (*verify_host_key)(Key *);
Key *(*load_host_key)(int);
+ int (*host_key_index)(Key *);
};
Kex *kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
index eaf497ca..6256722f 100644
--- a/kexdh.c
+++ b/kexdh.c
@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.17 2002/02/28 15:46:33 markus Exp $");
#include "packet.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern int mm_recvfd;
static u_char *
kex_dh_hash(
@@ -275,7 +281,12 @@ kexdh_server(Kex *kex)
/* sign H */
/* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
- key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_key_sign(mm_recvfd,
+ kex->host_key_index(server_host_key),
+ &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
+ else
+ key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
diff --git a/kexgex.c b/kexgex.c
index 61896e6e..3c811f33 100644
--- a/kexgex.c
+++ b/kexgex.c
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.20 2002/02/28 15:46:33 markus Exp $");
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "compat.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern int mm_recvfd;
static u_char *
kexgex_hash(
@@ -296,7 +302,11 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
fatal("DH_GEX_REQUEST, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
min, nbits, max);
- dh = choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
+ /* Contact privileged parent */
+ if (use_privsep)
+ dh = mm_choose_dh(mm_recvfd, min, nbits, max);
+ else
+ dh = choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
if (dh == NULL)
packet_disconnect("Protocol error: no matching DH grp found");
@@ -379,7 +389,11 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
/* sign H */
/* XXX hashlen depends on KEX */
- key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_key_sign(mm_recvfd, kex->host_key_index(server_host_key),
+ &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
+ else
+ key_sign(server_host_key, &signature, &slen, hash, 20);
/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
@@ -390,6 +404,7 @@ kexgex_server(Kex *kex)
packet_put_bignum2(dh->pub_key); /* f */
packet_put_string(signature, slen);
packet_send();
+
xfree(signature);
xfree(server_host_key_blob);
/* have keys, free DH */
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index cda91571..fb6bff95 100644
--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
@@ -801,3 +801,46 @@ key_verify(
break;
}
}
+
+/* Converts a private to a public key */
+
+Key *
+key_demote(Key *k)
+{
+ Key *pk;
+
+ pk = xmalloc(sizeof(*pk));
+ pk->type = k->type;
+ pk->flags = k->flags;
+ pk->dsa = NULL;
+ pk->rsa = NULL;
+
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: RSA_new failed");
+ if ((pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed");
+ if ((pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ if ((pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ if ((pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ if ((pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
+ fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return (pk);
+}
diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
index a2257731..bc8b3d06 100644
--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ struct Key {
Key *key_new(int);
Key *key_new_private(int);
void key_free(Key *);
+Key *key_demote(Key *);
int key_equal(Key *, Key *);
char *key_fingerprint(Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep);
char *key_type(Key *);
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b8579027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,656 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD$");
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "zlib.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+extern int compat20;
+extern int mm_sendfd;
+
+/* State exported from the child */
+
+struct {
+ z_stream incoming;
+ z_stream outgoing;
+ u_char *keyin;
+ u_int keyinlen;
+ u_char *keyout;
+ u_int keyoutlen;
+} child_state;
+
+/* Prototype for authentication functions */
+
+int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *);
+int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *);
+Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int);
+
+void session_pty_cleanup(void *);
+
+static Authctxt *authctxt;
+
+struct mon_table {
+ enum monitor_reqtype type;
+ int flags;
+ int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
+};
+
+#define MON_PROTOONE 0x0001 /* Used in protocol 1 */
+#define MON_PROTOTWO 0x0002 /* Used in protocol 2 */
+#define MON_AUTH 0x0004 /* Authentication Request */
+
+#define MON_BOTH (MON_PROTOONE|MON_PROTOTWO)
+
+#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_PROTOTWO, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_PROTOTWO, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_BOTH, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_BOTH, mm_answer_authserv},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_BOTH | MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_BOTH | MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_BOTH | MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_PROTOTWO, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_PROTOTWO, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_BOTH, mm_answer_pty},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, MON_BOTH, mm_answer_term},
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+
+/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+
+void
+monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
+{
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->type == type) {
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ ent++;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
+{
+ struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
+
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+ }
+ ent++;
+ }
+}
+
+#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
+ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) \
+ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
+} while (0)
+
+void
+monitor_socketpair(int *pair)
+{
+ if (socketpair(PF_LOCAL, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: socketpair", __FUNCTION__);
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+}
+
+Authctxt *
+monitor_child_preauth(int socket)
+{
+ debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ } else
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+ authctxt = authctxt_new();
+
+ /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+ for (;;) {
+ if (monitor_read(socket, mon_dispatch))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
+ __FUNCTION__, authctxt->user);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ mm_get_keystate(socket);
+ } else {
+ fatal("Use loose");
+ }
+
+ return (authctxt);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_postauth(int socket)
+{
+ if (compat20) {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+
+ if (!no_pty_flag)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+ } else
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (monitor_read(socket, mon_dispatch))
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+int
+monitor_read(int socket, struct mon_table *ent)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int ret;
+ u_char type;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ mm_request_receive(socket, &m);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: checking request %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->type == type)
+ break;
+ ent++;
+ }
+
+ if (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
+ fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __FUNCTION__,
+ type);
+ ret = (*ent->f)(socket, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d\n", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_moduli(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+ int min, want, max;
+
+ /* Turn off requests for moduli */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0);
+
+ min = buffer_get_int(m);
+ want = buffer_get_int(m);
+ max = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+ debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
+ __FUNCTION__, min, want, max);
+ /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
+ if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
+ fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
+ __FUNCTION__, min, want, max);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ /* Send first bignum */
+ buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *p;
+ u_char *signature;
+ u_int siglen, datlen;
+ int keyid;
+
+ debug3("%s", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
+ p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
+
+ if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __FUNCTION__, keyid);
+ if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ debug3("%s: signature %p(%d)", __FUNCTION__, signature, siglen);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
+
+ xfree(p);
+ xfree(signature);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+
+int
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *login;
+ struct passwd *pwent;
+ int allowed;
+
+ debug3("%s", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
+ fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ login = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ /* XXX - probably latch the username here */
+ pwent = getpwnam(login);
+ authctxt->user = xstrdup(login);
+ setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? login : "unknown");
+ xfree(login);
+
+ /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ if (pwent == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we permit this user */
+ allowed = allowed_user(pwent);
+
+ if (allowed) {
+ authctxt->pw = pwcopy(pwent);
+ authctxt->valid = 1;
+ }
+ buffer_put_char(m, allowed);
+ buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __FUNCTION__, allowed);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authserv(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ /* Disallow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 0);
+
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+ authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+ xfree(authctxt->style);
+ authctxt->style = NULL;
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
+ __FUNCTION__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *passwd;
+ int authenticated;
+
+ passwd = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
+ authenticated = authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+ memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+ xfree(passwd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending result %d", __FUNCTION__, authenticated);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+ /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *cuser, *chost, *blob;
+ u_int bloblen;
+ enum mm_keytype type = 0;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+
+ debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __FUNCTION__, key);
+
+ if (key != NULL && authctxt->pw != NULL) {
+ switch(type) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ allowed = user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ cuser, chost, key);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __FUNCTION__,
+ type);
+ break;
+ }
+ key_free(key);
+ }
+ xfree(chost);
+ xfree(cuser);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+ __FUNCTION__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "disallowed");
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *signature, *data, *cuser, *chost, *blob;
+ u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int type;
+ int verified = 0;
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+ data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if (authctxt->pw == NULL || !user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))
+ fatal("%s: user not allowed", __FUNCTION__);
+ verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ __FUNCTION__, key, verified ? "verified" : "unverified");
+
+ key_free(key);
+ xfree(chost);
+ xfree(cuser);
+ xfree(blob);
+ xfree(signature);
+ xfree(data);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+ return (verified);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ int res;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+ res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+ if (res == 0)
+ goto error;
+ fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+
+ buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+
+ mm_send_fd(mm_sendfd, s->ptyfd);
+ mm_send_fd(mm_sendfd, s->ttyfd);
+ return (0);
+
+ error:
+ if (s != NULL)
+ session_close(s);
+ buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req)
+{
+ debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ /* The child is terminating */
+ session_destroy_all();
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+void
+mm_apply_keystate(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+ /* XXX - delegate to child? */
+ set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+ set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+
+ packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
+ xfree(child_state.keyout);
+ packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
+ xfree(child_state.keyin);
+
+ memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
+ sizeof(incoming_stream));
+ memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
+ sizeof(outgoing_stream));
+
+ /* Update with new address */
+ mm_init_compression(mm);
+}
+
+/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
+
+void
+mm_get_keystate(int socket)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob, *p;
+ u_int bloblen, plen;
+
+ debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(socket, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __FUNCTION__);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
+ packet_set_seqnr(MODE_OUT, buffer_get_int(&m));
+ packet_set_seqnr(MODE_IN, buffer_get_int(&m));
+
+ /* Get the key context */
+ child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
+ child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
+
+ debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __FUNCTION__);
+ /* Get compression state */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+ if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
+ fatal("%s: bad request size", __FUNCTION__);
+ memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
+ xfree(p);
+
+ p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+ if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
+ fatal("%s: bad request size", __FUNCTION__);
+ memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
+ xfree(p);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+
+/* Allocation functions for zlib */
+void *
+mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
+{
+ void *address;
+
+ address = mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
+
+ return (address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+ mm_free(mm, address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+ outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+ outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+ outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
+
+ incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+ incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+ incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
+}
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7568603f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MONITOR_H_
+#define _MONITOR_H_
+
+enum monitor_reqtype {
+ MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI,
+ MONITOR_REQ_FREE, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV,
+ MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM,
+ MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD,
+ MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED,
+ MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY,
+ MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MONITOR_ANS_PTY,
+ MONITOR_REQ_TERM
+};
+
+struct monitor_req {
+ enum monitor_reqtype type;
+ void *address;
+ size_t size;
+};
+
+void monitor_socketpair(int *pair);
+
+struct Authctxt;
+struct Authctxt *monitor_child_preauth(int);
+void monitor_child_postauth(int);
+
+struct mon_table;
+int monitor_read(int, struct mon_table *);
+
+#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
diff --git a/monitor_fdpass.c b/monitor_fdpass.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..46087ae6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_fdpass.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+
+void
+mm_send_fd(int socket, int fd)
+{
+ struct msghdr msg;
+ char tmp[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ struct iovec vec;
+ char ch;
+
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)tmp;
+ msg.msg_controllen = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+ cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+ cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+ *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd;
+
+ vec.iov_base = &ch;
+ vec.iov_len = 1;
+ msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+
+ if (sendmsg(socket, &msg, 0) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: sendmsg(%d)", __FUNCTION__, fd);
+}
+
+int
+mm_receive_fd(int socket)
+{
+ struct msghdr msg;
+ char tmp[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+ struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+ struct iovec vec;
+ char ch;
+
+ memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+ vec.iov_base = &ch;
+ vec.iov_len = 1;
+ msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+ msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+ msg.msg_control = tmp;
+ msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(tmp);
+
+ if (recvmsg(socket, &msg, 0) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: recvmsg", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+ if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS)
+ fatal("%s: expected type %d got %d", __FUNCTION__,
+ SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type);
+ return (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
+}
diff --git a/monitor_fdpass.h b/monitor_fdpass.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cb6b71c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_fdpass.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_FDPASS_H_
+#define _MM_FDPASS_H_
+
+void mm_send_fd(int, int);
+int mm_receive_fd(int);
+
+#endif /* _MM_FDPASS_H_ */
diff --git a/monitor_mm.c b/monitor_mm.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..111c97d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_mm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,329 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD$");
+
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+
+static int
+mm_compare(struct mm_share *a, struct mm_share *b)
+{
+ return (a->address - b->address);
+}
+
+RB_GENERATE(mmtree, mm_share, next, mm_compare);
+
+static struct mm_share *
+mm_make_entry(struct mm_master *mm, struct mmtree *head,
+ void *address, size_t size)
+{
+ struct mm_share *tmp, *tmp2;
+
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ tmp = xmalloc(sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ else
+ tmp = mm_xmalloc(mm->mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ tmp->address = address;
+ tmp->size = size;
+
+ tmp2 = RB_INSERT(mmtree, head, tmp);
+ if (tmp2 != NULL)
+ fatal("mm_make_entry(%p): double address %p->%p(%d)",
+ mm, tmp2, address, size);
+
+ return (tmp);
+}
+
+/* Creates a shared memory area of a certain size */
+
+struct mm_master *
+mm_create(struct mm_master *mmalloc, size_t size)
+{
+ void *address;
+ struct mm_master *mm;
+
+ if (mmalloc == NULL)
+ mm = xmalloc(sizeof(struct mm_master));
+ else
+ mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+
+ /*
+ * If the memory map has a mm_master it can be completely
+ * shared including authentication between the child
+ * and the client.
+ */
+ mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+ address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED,
+ -1, 0);
+ if (address == MAP_FAILED)
+ fatal("mmap(%d)", size);
+
+ mm->address = address;
+ mm->size = size;
+
+ RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
+ RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
+
+ mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_free, address, size);
+
+ return (mm);
+}
+
+/* Frees either the allocated or the free list */
+
+void
+mm_freelist(struct mm_master *mmalloc, struct mmtree *head)
+{
+ struct mm_share *mms, *next;
+
+ for (mms = RB_ROOT(head); mms; mms = next) {
+ next = RB_NEXT(mmtree, head, mms);
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, head, mms);
+ if (mmalloc == NULL)
+ xfree(mms);
+ else
+ mm_free(mmalloc, mms);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Destroys a memory mapped area */
+
+void
+mm_destroy(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+ mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_free);
+ mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_allocated);
+
+ if (munmap(mm->address, mm->size) == -1)
+ fatal("munmap(%p, %d)", mm->address, mm->size);
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ xfree(mm);
+ else
+ mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mm);
+}
+
+void *
+mm_xmalloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size)
+{
+ void *address;
+
+ address = mm_malloc(mm, size);
+ if (address == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: mm_malloc(%d)", __FUNCTION__, size);
+ return (address);
+}
+
+
+/* Allocates data from a memory mapped area */
+
+void *
+mm_malloc(struct mm_master *mm, size_t size)
+{
+ struct mm_share *mms, *tmp;
+
+ if (size == 0)
+ fatal("mm_malloc: try to allocate 0 space");
+
+ size = ((size + MM_MINSIZE - 1) / MM_MINSIZE) * MM_MINSIZE;
+
+ RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, &mm->rb_free) {
+ if (mms->size >= size)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (mms == NULL)
+ return (NULL);
+
+ /* Debug */
+ memset(mms->address, 0xd0, size);
+
+ tmp = mm_make_entry(mm, &mm->rb_allocated, mms->address, size);
+
+ /* Does not change order in RB tree */
+ mms->size -= size;
+ mms->address = (u_char *)mms->address + size;
+
+ if (mms->size == 0) {
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ xfree(mms);
+ else
+ mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+ }
+
+ return (tmp->address);
+}
+
+/* Frees memory in a memory mapped area */
+
+void
+mm_free(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+ struct mm_share *mms, *prev, tmp;
+
+ tmp.address = address;
+ mms = RB_FIND(mmtree, &mm->rb_allocated, &tmp);
+ if (mms == NULL)
+ fatal("mm_free(%p): can not find %p", mm, address);
+
+ /* Debug */
+ memset(mms->address, 0xd0, mms->size);
+
+ /* Remove from allocated list and insert in free list */
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_allocated, mms);
+ if (RB_INSERT(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms) != NULL)
+ fatal("mm_free(%p): double address %p", mm, address);
+
+ /* Find previous entry */
+ prev = mms;
+ if (RB_LEFT(prev, next)) {
+ prev = RB_LEFT(prev, next);
+ while (RB_RIGHT(prev, next))
+ prev = RB_RIGHT(prev, next);
+ } else {
+ if (RB_PARENT(prev, next) &&
+ (prev == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(prev, next), next)))
+ prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+ else {
+ while (RB_PARENT(prev, next) &&
+ (prev == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(prev, next), next)))
+ prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+ prev = RB_PARENT(prev, next);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if range does not overlap */
+ if (prev != NULL && MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) > address)
+ fatal("mm_free: memory corruption: %p(%d) > %p",
+ prev->address, prev->size, address);
+
+ /* See if we can merge backwards */
+ if (prev != NULL && MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) == address) {
+ prev->size += mms->size;
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ xfree(mms);
+ else
+ mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+ } else
+ prev = mms;
+
+ if (prev == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Check if we can merge forwards */
+ mms = RB_NEXT(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, prev);
+ if (mms == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) > mms->address)
+ fatal("mm_free: memory corruption: %p < %p(%d)",
+ mms->address, prev->address, prev->size);
+ if (MM_ADDRESS_END(prev) != mms->address)
+ return;
+
+ prev->size += mms->size;
+ RB_REMOVE(mmtree, &mm->rb_free, mms);
+
+ if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
+ xfree(mms);
+ else
+ mm_free(mm->mmalloc, mms);
+}
+
+void
+mm_sync_list(struct mmtree *oldtree, struct mmtree *newtree,
+ struct mm_master *mm, struct mm_master *mmold)
+{
+ struct mm_master *mmalloc = mm->mmalloc;
+ struct mm_share *mms, *new;
+
+ /* Sync free list */
+ RB_FOREACH(mms, mmtree, oldtree) {
+ /* Check the values */
+ mm_memvalid(mmold, mms, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ mm_memvalid(mm, mms->address, mms->size);
+
+ new = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ memcpy(new, mms, sizeof(struct mm_share));
+ RB_INSERT(mmtree, newtree, new);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+mm_share_sync(struct mm_master **pmm, struct mm_master **pmmalloc)
+{
+ struct mm_master *mm;
+ struct mm_master *mmalloc;
+ struct mm_master *mmold;
+ struct mmtree rb_free, rb_allocated;
+
+ debug3("%s: Share sync", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ mm = *pmm;
+ mmold = mm->mmalloc;
+ mm_memvalid(mmold, mm, sizeof(*mm));
+
+ mmalloc = mm_create(NULL, mm->size);
+ mm = mm_xmalloc(mmalloc, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+ memcpy(mm, *pmm, sizeof(struct mm_master));
+ mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+ rb_free = mm->rb_free;
+ rb_allocated = mm->rb_allocated;
+
+ RB_INIT(&mm->rb_free);
+ RB_INIT(&mm->rb_allocated);
+
+ mm_sync_list(&rb_free, &mm->rb_free, mm, mmold);
+ mm_sync_list(&rb_allocated, &mm->rb_allocated, mm, mmold);
+
+ mm_destroy(mmold);
+
+ *pmm = mm;
+ *pmmalloc = mmalloc;
+
+ debug3("%s: Share sync end", __FUNCTION__);
+}
+
+void
+mm_memvalid(struct mm_master *mm, void *address, size_t size)
+{
+ void *end = (u_char *)address + size;
+
+ if (address < mm->address)
+ fatal("mm_memvalid: address too small: %p", address);
+ if (end < address)
+ fatal("mm_memvalid: end < address: %p < %p", end, address);
+ if (end > (void *)((u_char *)mm->address + mm->size))
+ fatal("mm_memvalid: address too large: %p", address);
+}
diff --git a/monitor_mm.h b/monitor_mm.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5b4b789c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_mm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_H_
+#define _MM_H_
+#include <sys/tree.h>
+
+struct mm_share {
+ RB_ENTRY(mm_share) next;
+ void *address;
+ size_t size;
+};
+
+struct mm_master {
+ RB_HEAD(mmtree, mm_share) rb_free;
+ struct mmtree rb_allocated;
+ void *address;
+ size_t size;
+
+ struct mm_master *mmalloc; /* Used to completely share */
+
+ int write; /* used to writing to other party */
+ int read; /* used for reading from other party */
+};
+
+RB_PROTOTYPE(mmtree, mm_share, next, mm_compare);
+
+#define MM_MINSIZE 128
+
+#define MM_ADDRESS_END(x) (void *)((u_char *)(x)->address + (x)->size)
+
+struct mm_master *mm_create(struct mm_master *, size_t);
+void mm_destroy(struct mm_master *);
+
+void mm_share_sync(struct mm_master **, struct mm_master **);
+
+void *mm_malloc(struct mm_master *, size_t);
+void *mm_xmalloc(struct mm_master *, size_t);
+void mm_free(struct mm_master *, void *);
+
+void mm_memvalid(struct mm_master *, void *, size_t);
+#endif /* _MM_H_ */
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..798e9353
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+RCSID("$OpenBSD$");
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "bufaux.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "zlib.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "getput.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern Newkeys *newkeys[];
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+
+void
+mm_request_send(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_char buf[5];
+ u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
+
+ debug3("%s entering: type %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+ PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
+ buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
+ if (atomicio(write, socket, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
+ fatal("%s: write", __FUNCTION__);
+ if (atomicio(write, socket, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
+ fatal("%s: write", __FUNCTION__);
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_char buf[4];
+ ssize_t res;
+ u_int msg_len;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ res = atomicio(read, socket, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (res != sizeof(buf))
+ fatal("%s: read: %d", __FUNCTION__, res);
+ msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
+ if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+ fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __FUNCTION__, msg_len);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_append_space(m, msg_len);
+ res = atomicio(read, socket, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len);
+ if (res != msg_len)
+ fatal("%s: read: %d != msg_len", __FUNCTION__, res);
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive_expect(int socket, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_char rtype;
+
+ debug3("%s entering: type %d", __FUNCTION__, type);
+
+ mm_request_receive(socket, m);
+ rtype = buffer_get_char(m);
+ if (rtype != type)
+ fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __FUNCTION__,
+ rtype, type);
+}
+
+DH *
+mm_choose_dh(int socket, int min, int nbits, int max)
+{
+ BIGNUM *p, *g;
+ int success = 0;
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, min);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, nbits);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, max);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __FUNCTION__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(socket, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m);
+
+ success = buffer_get_char(&m);
+ if (success == 0)
+ fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g);
+
+ debug3("%s: remaining %d", __FUNCTION__, buffer_len(&m));
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (dh_new_group(g, p));
+}
+
+int
+mm_key_sign(int socket, int keyind, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, keyind);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __FUNCTION__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m);
+ *sigp = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+mm_getpwnamallow(int socket, const char *login, int *allowed)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ u_int pwlen;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, login);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __FUNCTION__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m);
+
+ *allowed = buffer_get_char(&m);
+ if (*allowed == 0) {
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &pwlen);
+ if (pwlen != sizeof(struct passwd))
+ fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __FUNCTION__);
+ pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (pw);
+}
+
+void
+pwfree(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ xfree(pw->pw_name);
+ xfree(pw->pw_passwd);
+ xfree(pw->pw_gecos);
+ xfree(pw->pw_class);
+ xfree(pw->pw_dir);
+ xfree(pw->pw_shell);
+ xfree(pw);
+}
+
+/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authserv(int socket, char *service, char *style)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, service);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : "");
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+/* Do the password authentication */
+int
+mm_auth_password(int socket, char *password)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, password);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __FUNCTION__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m);
+
+ authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
+ __FUNCTION__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+int
+mm_key_allowed(int socket, enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host,
+ Key *key)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int len;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+ return (0);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : "");
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __FUNCTION__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m);
+
+ allowed = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (allowed);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
+ * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
+ * for authentication.
+ */
+
+int
+mm_key_verify(int socket, enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host,
+ Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int len;
+ int verified = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */
+ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len))
+ return (0);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ buffer_put_int(&m, type);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : "");
+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : "");
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __FUNCTION__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m);
+
+ verified = buffer_get_int(&m);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ return (verified);
+}
+
+/* Export key state after authentication */
+Newkeys *
+mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ int rlen;
+ Newkeys *newkey = NULL;
+ Enc *enc;
+ Mac *mac;
+ Comp *comp;
+
+ debug3("%s: %p(%d)", __FUNCTION__, blob, blen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen);
+#endif
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, blob, blen);
+
+ newkey = xmalloc(sizeof(*newkey));
+ enc = &newkey->enc;
+ mac = &newkey->mac;
+ comp = &newkey->comp;
+
+ /* Enc structure */
+ enc->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ buffer_get(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
+ enc->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ enc->key_len = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ enc->block_size = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ enc->key = xmalloc(enc->key_len);
+ buffer_get(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len);
+ enc->iv = xmalloc(enc->block_size);
+ buffer_get(&b, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+
+ if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher)
+ fatal("%s: bad cipher name %s or pointer %p", __FUNCTION__,
+ enc->name, enc->cipher);
+
+ /* Mac structure */
+ mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (mac->name == NULL || mac_init(mac, mac->name) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: can not init mac %s", __FUNCTION__, mac->name);
+ mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ mac->key = xmalloc(mac->key_len);
+ buffer_get(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len);
+
+ /* Comp structure */
+ comp->type = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ comp->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b);
+ comp->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+
+ rlen = buffer_len(&b);
+ if (rlen != 0)
+ error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %d", rlen);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (newkey);
+}
+
+int
+mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ int len;
+ u_char *buf;
+ Enc *enc;
+ Mac *mac;
+ Comp *comp;
+ Newkeys *newkey = newkeys[mode];
+
+ debug3("%s: converting %p", __FUNCTION__, newkey);
+
+ if (newkey == NULL) {
+ error("%s: newkey == NULL", __FUNCTION__);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ enc = &newkey->enc;
+ mac = &newkey->mac;
+ comp = &newkey->comp;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ /* Enc structure */
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, enc->name);
+ /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */
+ buffer_append(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher));
+ buffer_put_int(&b, enc->enabled);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, enc->key_len);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, enc->block_size);
+ buffer_append(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len);
+ packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+ buffer_append(&b, enc->iv, enc->block_size);
+
+ /* Mac structure */
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled);
+ buffer_append(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len);
+
+ /* Comp structure */
+ buffer_put_int(&b, comp->type);
+ buffer_put_int(&b, comp->enabled);
+ buffer_put_cstring(&b, comp->name);
+
+ len = buffer_len(&b);
+ buf = xmalloc(len);
+ memcpy(buf, buffer_ptr(&b), len);
+ memset(buffer_ptr(&b), 0, len);
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = len;
+ if (blobp != NULL)
+ *blobp = buf;
+ return len;
+}
+
+void
+mm_send_keystate(int socket)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob, *p;
+ u_int bloblen, plen;
+
+ debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p",
+ __FUNCTION__, newkeys[MODE_OUT], newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ /* Keys from Kex */
+ if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen))
+ fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
+ fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_seqnr(MODE_OUT));
+ buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_seqnr(MODE_IN));
+
+ debug3("%s: New keys have been sent", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ /* More key context */
+ plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, NULL);
+ p = xmalloc(plen+1);
+ packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, p);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
+ xfree(p);
+
+ plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, NULL);
+ p = xmalloc(plen+1);
+ packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, p);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen);
+ xfree(p);
+
+ /* Compression state */
+ debug3("%s: Sending compression state", __FUNCTION__);
+ buffer_put_string(&m, &outgoing_stream, sizeof(outgoing_stream));
+ buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream));
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+ debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_pty_allocown(int socket, int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
+ char *namebuf, int namebuflen)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *p;
+ int success = 0;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m);
+
+ debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __FUNCTION__);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m);
+
+ success = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ if (success == 0) {
+ debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __FUNCTION__);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
+ xfree(p);
+
+ *ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(socket);
+ *ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(socket);
+
+ /* Success */
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/* Request process termination */
+
+void
+mm_terminate(int socket)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3c837802
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
+#define _MM_WRAP_H_
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+
+struct mm_moduli {
+ int min;
+ int want;
+ int max;
+};
+
+enum mm_keytype {MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY};
+
+struct mm_keyallowed {
+ enum mm_keytype type;
+ char chost[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ char cuser[MAXLOGNAME];
+};
+
+struct mm_master;
+
+struct passwd;
+DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int, int);
+DH *mm_read_moduli(int);
+int mm_key_sign(int, int, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int);
+void mm_inform_authserv(int, char *, char *);
+struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(int, const char *, int *);
+int mm_auth_password(int, char *);
+int mm_key_allowed(int, enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *);
+#define mm_hostbased_key_allowed(x,u,h,z) \
+ mm_key_allowed(x, MM_HOSTKEY, u, h, z)
+#define mm_user_key_allowed(x,z) \
+ mm_key_allowed(x, MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, z)
+
+int mm_key_verify(int, enum mm_keytype, char *, char *,
+ Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int);
+
+void mm_terminate(int);
+
+/* Key export functions */
+struct Newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
+int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void mm_apply_keystate(struct mm_master *);
+void mm_get_keystate(int);
+void mm_send_keystate(int);
+
+int mm_pty_allocown(int, int *, int *, char *, int);
+
+/* Functions on the montior that answer unprivileged requests */
+
+int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
+
+void mm_request_send(int , enum monitor_reqtype, Buffer *);
+void mm_request_receive(int, Buffer *);
+void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype,
+ Buffer *);
+
+void *mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *, u_int, u_int);
+void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *, void *);
+void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *);
+
+/* Utility functions */
+
+void pwfree(struct passwd *);
+#endif /* _MM_H_ */
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 045d5a10..1c80af12 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ static int interactive_mode = 0;
/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+static u_int32_t read_seqnr = 0;
+static u_int32_t send_seqnr = 0;
/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
static u_char extra_pad = 0;
@@ -171,6 +173,87 @@ packet_connection_is_on_socket(void)
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key
+ * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
+ * process.
+ */
+
+void
+packet_get_keyiv(int mode, u_char *iv, u_int len)
+{
+ CipherContext *cc;
+
+ if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+ cc = &send_context;
+ else
+ cc = &receive_context;
+
+ cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len);
+}
+
+int
+packet_get_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
+{
+ int plen;
+ CipherContext *cc;
+
+ if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+ cc = &send_context;
+ else
+ cc = &receive_context;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+ plen = sizeof(cc->evp.c);
+#else
+ plen = cc->evp.cipher->ctx_size;
+#endif
+
+ if (dat == NULL)
+ return (plen);
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+ memcpy(dat, &cc->evp.c, sizeof(cc->evp.c));
+#else
+ memcpy(dat, &cc->evp.cipher_data, plen);
+#endif
+ return (plen);
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat)
+{
+ CipherContext *cc;
+
+ if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+ cc = &send_context;
+ else
+ cc = &receive_context;
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L
+ memcpy(&cc->evp.c, dat, sizeof(cc->evp.c));
+#else
+ memcpy(&cc->evp.cipher_data, dat, cc->evp.cipher->ctx_size);
+#endif
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+packet_get_seqnr(int mode)
+{
+ return (mode == MODE_IN ? read_seqnr : send_seqnr);
+}
+
+void
+packet_set_seqnr(int mode, u_int32_t seqnr)
+{
+ if (mode == MODE_IN)
+ read_seqnr = seqnr;
+ else if (mode == MODE_OUT)
+ send_seqnr = seqnr;
+ else
+ fatal("%s: bad mode %d", __FUNCTION__, mode);
+}
+
/* returns 1 if connection is via ipv4 */
int
@@ -433,7 +516,7 @@ packet_send1(void)
*/
}
-static void
+void
set_newkeys(int mode)
{
Enc *enc;
@@ -477,8 +560,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode));
cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
enc->iv, enc->block_size, encrypt);
- memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
- memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+ /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
+ /* memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size);
+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); */
if (comp->type != 0 && comp->enabled == 0) {
packet_init_compression();
if (mode == MODE_OUT)
@@ -495,7 +579,6 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
static void
packet_send2(void)
{
- static u_int32_t seqnr = 0;
u_char type, *cp, *macbuf = NULL;
u_char padlen, pad;
u_int packet_length = 0;
@@ -576,10 +659,10 @@ packet_send2(void)
/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
- macbuf = mac_compute(mac, seqnr,
+ macbuf = mac_compute(mac, send_seqnr,
buffer_ptr(&outgoing_packet),
buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
- DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", seqnr));
+ DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", send_seqnr));
}
/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
cp = buffer_append_space(&output, buffer_len(&outgoing_packet));
@@ -593,7 +676,7 @@ packet_send2(void)
buffer_dump(&output);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
- if (++seqnr == 0)
+ if (++send_seqnr == 0)
log("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
buffer_clear(&outgoing_packet);
@@ -783,7 +866,6 @@ packet_read_poll1(void)
static int
packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
- static u_int32_t seqnr = 0;
static u_int packet_length = 0;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *macbuf, *cp, type;
@@ -845,17 +927,17 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
* increment sequence number for incoming packet
*/
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
- macbuf = mac_compute(mac, seqnr,
+ macbuf = mac_compute(mac, read_seqnr,
buffer_ptr(&incoming_packet),
buffer_len(&incoming_packet));
if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&input), mac->mac_len) != 0)
packet_disconnect("Corrupted MAC on input.");
- DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", seqnr));
+ DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", read_seqnr));
buffer_consume(&input, mac->mac_len);
}
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
- *seqnr_p = seqnr;
- if (++seqnr == 0)
+ *seqnr_p = read_seqnr;
+ if (++read_seqnr == 0)
log("incoming seqnr wraps around");
/* get padlen */
diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
index d6bf2aab..b87a03cf 100644
--- a/packet.h
+++ b/packet.h
@@ -56,6 +56,13 @@ void *packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr);
void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void set_newkeys(int mode);
+void packet_get_keyiv(int, u_char *, u_int);
+int packet_get_keycontext(int, u_char *);
+void packet_set_keycontext(int, u_char *);
+u_int32_t packet_get_seqnr(int);
+void packet_set_seqnr(int, u_int32_t);
+
void packet_write_poll(void);
void packet_write_wait(void);
int packet_have_data_to_write(void);
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 9bbd994c..c3f1253e 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, u_short);
/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
extern int IPv4or6;
+/* Use of privilege separation or not */
+extern int use_privsep;
/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
@@ -110,6 +112,9 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
options->authorized_keys_file = NULL;
options->authorized_keys_file2 = NULL;
+
+ /* Needs to be accessable in many places */
+ use_privsep = -1;
}
void
@@ -235,6 +240,10 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
}
if (options->authorized_keys_file == NULL)
options->authorized_keys_file = _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS;
+
+ /* Turn privilege separation on by default */
+ if (use_privsep == -1)
+ use_privsep = 1;
}
/* Keyword tokens. */
@@ -267,6 +276,7 @@ typedef enum {
sBanner, sVerifyReverseMapping, sHostbasedAuthentication,
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval,
sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sAuthorizedKeysFile2,
+ sUsePrivilegeSeparation,
sDeprecated
} ServerOpCodes;
@@ -342,6 +352,7 @@ static struct {
{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax },
{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile },
{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2 },
+ { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation},
{ NULL, sBadOption }
};
@@ -718,6 +729,10 @@ parse_flag:
intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
+ case sUsePrivilegeSeparation:
+ intptr = &use_privsep;
+ goto parse_flag;
+
case sAllowUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index a31ff85d..17227c9f 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.128 2002/02/16 00:51:44 markus Exp $");
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
#include <windows.h>
@@ -63,39 +65,15 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.128 2002/02/16 00:51:44 markus Exp $");
#define is_winnt (GetVersion() < 0x80000000)
#endif
-/* types */
-
-#define TTYSZ 64
-typedef struct Session Session;
-struct Session {
- int used;
- int self;
- struct passwd *pw;
- Authctxt *authctxt;
- pid_t pid;
- /* tty */
- char *term;
- int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
- int row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
- char tty[TTYSZ];
- /* X11 */
- int display_number;
- char *display;
- int screen;
- char *auth_display;
- char *auth_proto;
- char *auth_data;
- int single_connection;
- /* proto 2 */
- int chanid;
- int is_subsystem;
-};
+/* Imports */
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern int mm_recvfd;
/* func */
Session *session_new(void);
void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int);
-static void session_pty_cleanup(void *);
+void session_pty_cleanup(void *);
void session_proctitle(Session *);
int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *);
void do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *);
@@ -112,7 +90,6 @@ int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *);
static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *);
-static void session_close(Session *);
static int session_pty_req(Session *);
/* import */
@@ -1448,7 +1425,8 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
{
u_int len;
int n_bytes;
-
+ int res;
+
if (no_pty_flag) {
debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication.");
return 0;
@@ -1477,7 +1455,15 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
debug("Allocating pty.");
- if (!pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty))) {
+ if (!use_privsep) {
+ res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
+ sizeof(s->tty));
+ if (res)
+ pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+ } else
+ res = mm_pty_allocown(mm_recvfd,
+ &s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+ if (!res) {
if (s->term)
xfree(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
@@ -1498,7 +1484,6 @@ session_pty_req(Session *s)
* time in case we call fatal() (e.g., the connection gets closed).
*/
fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup, (void *)s);
- pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
/* Set window size from the packet. */
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
@@ -1661,7 +1646,7 @@ session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr)
* Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
* (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
*/
-static void
+void
session_pty_cleanup(void *session)
{
Session *s = session;
@@ -1739,7 +1724,7 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int status)
s->chanid = -1;
}
-static void
+void
session_close(Session *s)
{
debug("session_close: session %d pid %d", s->self, s->pid);
diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
index ec8284a5..e3123bee 100644
--- a/session.h
+++ b/session.h
@@ -26,6 +26,32 @@
#ifndef SESSION_H
#define SESSION_H
+#define TTYSZ 64
+typedef struct Session Session;
+struct Session {
+ int used;
+ int self;
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
+ pid_t pid;
+ /* tty */
+ char *term;
+ int ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+ int row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
+ char tty[TTYSZ];
+ /* X11 */
+ int display_number;
+ char *display;
+ int screen;
+ char *auth_display;
+ char *auth_proto;
+ char *auth_data;
+ int single_connection;
+ /* proto 2 */
+ int chanid;
+ int is_subsystem;
+};
+
void do_authenticated(Authctxt *);
int session_open(Authctxt*, int);
@@ -34,4 +60,6 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int);
void session_close_by_channel(int, void *);
void session_destroy_all(void);
+Session *session_new(void);
+void session_close(Session *);
#endif
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index ea929325..cbe31608 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -72,6 +72,11 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.228 2002/02/27 21:23:13 stevesk Exp $");
#include "misc.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#ifdef LIBWRAP
#include <tcpd.h>
@@ -189,8 +194,20 @@ u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN;
int *startup_pipes = NULL;
int startup_pipe; /* in child */
+/* variables used for privilege separation */
+#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
+struct mm_master *mm_zback;
+struct mm_master *mm_zlib;
+
+extern int use_privsep;
+/* Socket for the child to receive a fd */
+extern int mm_recvfd;
+/* Socket for the parent to send a fd */
+int mm_sendfd;
+
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
@@ -477,6 +494,69 @@ destroy_sensitive_data(void)
memset(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, 0, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
}
+/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+void
+demote_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+ Key *tmp;
+ int i;
+
+ if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
+ tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
+ sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+ tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+ sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
+}
+
+void
+privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (0) {
+ /* File descriptor passing is broken */
+ mm_apply_keystate(mm_zlib);
+ use_privsep = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1)
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ else if (pid != 0) {
+ debug2("User child is on pid %d", pid);
+ close(mm_recvfd);
+ monitor_child_postauth(mm_sendfd);
+
+ /* Teardown? */
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ close(mm_sendfd);
+
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* Drop privileges */
+ if (seteuid(authctxt->pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: seteuid", __FUNCTION__);
+ if (setuid(authctxt->pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: setuid", __FUNCTION__);
+
+ /* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+ mm_apply_keystate(mm_zlib);
+}
+
+
static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
@@ -518,6 +598,25 @@ get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
return NULL;
}
+Key *
+get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
+{
+ if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+ return (NULL);
+ return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
+}
+
+int
+get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+ if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
+ return (i);
+ }
+ return (-1);
+}
+
/*
* returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
* dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
@@ -594,6 +693,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
int listen_sock, maxfd;
int startup_p[2];
int startups = 0;
+ Authctxt *authctxt;
+ int sp[2];
Key *key;
int ret, key_used = 0;
@@ -1231,23 +1332,84 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
packet_set_nonblocking();
+ if (!use_privsep)
+ goto skip_privilegeseparation;
+
+ /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
+ monitor_socketpair(sp);
+ mm_recvfd = sp[0];
+ mm_sendfd = sp[1];
+
+ /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
+ mm_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
+ mm_zlib = mm_create(mm_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
+
+ /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
+ mm_init_compression(mm_zlib);
+
+ pid = fork();
+ if (pid == -1)
+ fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+ else if (pid != 0) {
+ debug2("Network child is on pid %d", pid);
+ authctxt = monitor_child_preauth(mm_sendfd);
+
+ /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
+ mm_share_sync(&mm_zlib, &mm_zback);
+ goto authenticated;
+ } else {
+ /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+ demote_sensitive_data();
+
+ /* Change our root directory - /var/empty is standard*/
+ if (chroot("/var/empty") == -1)
+ fatal("chroot(/var/empty)");
+ if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ fatal("chdir(/)");
+
+ /* Drop our privileges */
+ seteuid(32767); /* XXX - Niels */
+ setuid(32767);
+ }
+
+ skip_privilegeseparation:
+
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
if (compat20) {
do_ssh2_kex();
- do_authentication2();
+ authctxt = do_authentication2();
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_send_keystate(mm_recvfd);
} else {
do_ssh1_kex();
- do_authentication();
+ authctxt = do_authentication();
}
- /* The connection has been terminated. */
- verbose("Closing connection to %.100s", remote_ip);
+
+ /* If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child exits */
+ if (use_privsep)
+ exit(0);
+
+ authenticated:
+ /*
+ * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
+ * file descriptor passing.
+ */
+ if (use_privsep)
+ privsep_postauth(authctxt);
+
+ /* Perform session preparation. */
+ do_authenticated(authctxt);
#ifdef USE_PAM
finish_pam();
#endif /* USE_PAM */
packet_close();
+
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_terminate(mm_recvfd);
+
exit(0);
}
@@ -1453,8 +1615,6 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void)
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16];
}
- /* Destroy the private and public keys. They will no longer be needed. */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
/* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
BN_clear_free(session_key_int);
@@ -1502,6 +1662,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
xxx_kex = kex;