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authorDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2010-04-16 15:56:21 +1000
committerDamien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>2010-04-16 15:56:21 +1000
commit4e270b05dd9d850fb9e2e0ac43f33cb4090d3ebc (patch)
tree4fc84942b5966e9f38f18a1257ac43ddbed336be
parent031c9100dfe3ee65a29084ebbd61965a76b3ad26 (diff)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c] [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the following changes: move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash Rename "constraints" field to "critical options" Add a new non-critical "extensions" field Add a serial number The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate) ok markus@
-rw-r--r--ChangeLog21
-rw-r--r--PROTOCOL.certkeys73
-rw-r--r--auth-options.c21
-rw-r--r--auth-options.h4
-rw-r--r--auth-rsa.c4
-rw-r--r--auth2-pubkey.c9
-rw-r--r--authfd.c6
-rw-r--r--key.c177
-rw-r--r--key.h11
-rw-r--r--myproposal.h11
-rw-r--r--ssh-add.c4
-rw-r--r--ssh-agent.c5
-rw-r--r--ssh-dss.c12
-rw-r--r--ssh-keygen.127
-rw-r--r--ssh-keygen.c235
-rw-r--r--ssh-rsa.c12
-rw-r--r--sshconnect.c8
-rw-r--r--sshconnect2.c7
-rw-r--r--sshd.c15
19 files changed, 449 insertions, 213 deletions
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index fd4ce5db..b058de0f 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -41,6 +41,27 @@
retry lookup for private key if there's no matching key with CKA_SIGN
attribute enabled; this fixes fixes MuscleCard support (bugzilla #1736)
ok djm@
+ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26
+ [PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
+ [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
+ [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
+ [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
+ revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
+ following changes:
+
+ move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
+ better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
+
+ Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
+
+ Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
+
+ Add a serial number
+
+ The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
+ (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
+
+ ok markus@
20100410
- (dtucker) [configure.ac] Put the check for the existence of getaddrinfo
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/PROTOCOL.certkeys
index 1ed9e206..a2069f54 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL.certkeys
+++ b/PROTOCOL.certkeys
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication.
The certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with
numerous options and complex encoding rules, but something rather
-more minimal: a key, some identity information and usage constraints
+more minimal: a key, some identity information and usage options
that have been signed with some other trusted key.
A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ of acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability
to specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
Certified keys are represented using two new key types:
-ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com that
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com that
include certification information along with the public key that is used
to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing operation.
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ in RFC4252 section 7.
New public key formats
----------------------
-The ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com key
+The ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com key
types take a similar high-level format (note: data types and
encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire encoding of
these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
@@ -57,42 +57,55 @@ these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
RSA certificate
- string "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com"
+ string "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+ string nonce
mpint e
mpint n
+ uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
- string constraints
- string nonce
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
DSA certificate
- string "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com"
+ string "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+ string nonce
mpint p
mpint q
mpint g
mpint y
+ uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
- string constraints
- string nonce
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
+The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
+(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
+inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
+
e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
+serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
+provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
+If a CA does not with to number its certificates it must set this
+field to zero.
+
type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user
or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value.
@@ -112,13 +125,15 @@ certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
valid after <= current time < valid before
-constraints is a set of zero or more key constraints encoded as below.
+criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
+below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
+must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
-The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
-(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
-inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
+extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions
+are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does
+not recognise may safely ignore it. No extensions are defined at present.
-The reserved field is current unused and is ignored in this version of
+The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
the protocol.
signature key contains the CA key used to sign the certificate.
@@ -132,22 +147,22 @@ up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss).
-Constraints
------------
+Critical options
+----------------
-The constraints section of the certificate specifies zero or more
-constraints on the certificates validity. The format of this field
+The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more
+options on the certificates validity. The format of this field
is a sequence of zero or more tuples:
string name
string data
-The name field identifies the constraint and the data field encodes
-constraint-specific information (see below). All constraints are
-"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a constraint
+The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes
+option-specific information (see below). All options are
+"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option
then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate.
-The supported constraints and the contents and structure of their
+The supported options and the contents and structure of their
data fields are:
Name Format Description
@@ -159,35 +174,35 @@ force-command string Specifies a command that is executed
permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
- be refused if this constraint is absent.
+ be refused if this option is absent.
permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding
should be allowed. Agent forwarding
must not be permitted unless this
- constraint is present.
+ option is present.
permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding
- should be allowed. If this constraint is
+ should be allowed. If this option is
not present then no port forwarding will
be allowed.
permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation
should be permitted. In the absence of
- this constraint PTY allocation will be
+ this option PTY allocation will be
disabled.
permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
of this script will not be permitted if
- this constraint is not present.
+ this option is not present.
source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses
from which this certificate is accepted
for authentication. Addresses are
specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
- If this constraint is not present then
+ If this option is not present then
certificates may be presented from any
source address.
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.3 2010/03/03 22:50:40 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.4 2010/04/16 01:47:25 djm Exp $
diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
index 69b314fb..60d5f749 100644
--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.49 2010/03/16 15:46:52 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.50 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -27,10 +27,10 @@
#include "canohost.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "channels.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -377,11 +377,11 @@ bad_option:
}
/*
- * Set options from certificate constraints. These supersede user key options
- * so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
+ * Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key
+ * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
*/
int
-auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw)
+auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw)
{
u_char *name = NULL, *data_blob = NULL;
u_int nlen, dlen, clen;
@@ -400,12 +400,13 @@ auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw)
/* Make copy to avoid altering original */
buffer_init(&c);
- buffer_append(&c, buffer_ptr(c_orig), buffer_len(c_orig));
+ buffer_append(&c,
+ buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical), buffer_len(&k->cert->critical));
while (buffer_len(&c) > 0) {
if ((name = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, &nlen)) == NULL ||
(data_blob = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, &dlen)) == NULL) {
- error("Certificate constraints corrupt");
+ error("Certificate options corrupt");
goto out;
}
buffer_append(&data, data_blob, dlen);
@@ -439,7 +440,7 @@ auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw)
}
if (cert_forced_command != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
- "force-command constraints");
+ "force-command options");
xfree(command);
goto out;
}
@@ -459,7 +460,7 @@ auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw)
}
if (cert_source_address_done++) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
- "source-address constraints");
+ "source-address options");
xfree(allowed);
goto out;
}
@@ -502,7 +503,7 @@ auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw)
name = data_blob = NULL;
}
- /* successfully parsed all constraints */
+ /* successfully parsed all options */
ret = 0;
no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag;
diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
index 694edc84..20f0dbe3 100644
--- a/auth-options.h
+++ b/auth-options.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.18 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.19 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@ extern int key_is_cert_authority;
int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
void auth_clear_options(void);
-int auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *, struct passwd *);
+int auth_cert_options(Key *, struct passwd *);
#endif
diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c
index 65571a89..326937ac 100644
--- a/auth-rsa.c
+++ b/auth-rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.74 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.75 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "buffer.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index c4cadf4e..83ecd659 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.22 2010/03/10 23:27:17 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.23 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
}
if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1)
continue;
- if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT) {
+ if (key_is_cert(key)) {
if (!key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
@@ -251,8 +251,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
continue;
}
- if (auth_cert_constraints(&key->cert->constraints,
- pw) != 0) {
+ if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
xfree(fp);
continue;
}
@@ -307,7 +306,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
goto out;
}
- if (auth_cert_constraints(&key->cert->constraints, pw) != 0)
+ if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
goto out;
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index 28a8cf2d..739722fb 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.82 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.83 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
break;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
@@ -500,6 +501,7 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
@@ -535,8 +537,10 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
type = constrained ?
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
diff --git a/key.c b/key.c
index 66592c7e..34f678b3 100644
--- a/key.c
+++ b/key.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.86 2010/03/15 19:40:02 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.87 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* read_bignum():
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@ cert_new(void)
cert = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cert));
buffer_init(&cert->certblob);
- buffer_init(&cert->constraints);
+ buffer_init(&cert->critical);
+ buffer_init(&cert->extensions);
cert->key_id = NULL;
cert->principals = NULL;
cert->signature_key = NULL;
@@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ key_new(int type)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed");
@@ -92,6 +94,7 @@ key_new(int type)
k->rsa = rsa;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed");
@@ -124,6 +127,7 @@ key_add_private(Key *k)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
@@ -139,6 +143,7 @@ key_add_private(Key *k)
fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
break;
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
@@ -165,7 +170,8 @@ cert_free(struct KeyCert *cert)
u_int i;
buffer_free(&cert->certblob);
- buffer_free(&cert->constraints);
+ buffer_free(&cert->critical);
+ buffer_free(&cert->extensions);
if (cert->key_id != NULL)
xfree(cert->key_id);
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
@@ -184,12 +190,14 @@ key_free(Key *k)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (k->rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(k->rsa);
k->rsa = NULL;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (k->dsa != NULL)
DSA_free(k->dsa);
@@ -238,11 +246,13 @@ key_equal_public(const Key *a, const Key *b)
switch (a->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
@@ -304,6 +314,8 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length)
case KEY_RSA:
key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len);
break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* We want a fingerprint of the _key_ not of the cert */
@@ -631,6 +643,8 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
case KEY_UNSPEC:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
space = strchr(cp, ' ');
@@ -757,11 +771,13 @@ key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
error("key_write: failed for RSA key");
return 0;
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (key->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
break;
case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (key->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -793,6 +809,10 @@ key_type(const Key *k)
return "RSA";
case KEY_DSA:
return "DSA";
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ return "RSA-CERT-V00";
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ return "DSA-CERT-V00";
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return "RSA-CERT";
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
@@ -822,10 +842,14 @@ key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
return "ssh-rsa";
case KEY_DSA:
return "ssh-dss";
- case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
return "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com";
- case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
return "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com";
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ return "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ return "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com";
}
return "ssh-unknown";
}
@@ -836,9 +860,11 @@ key_size(const Key *k)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
}
@@ -882,6 +908,8 @@ key_generate(int type, u_int bits)
case KEY_RSA1:
k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits);
break;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
fatal("key_generate: cert keys cannot be generated directly");
@@ -912,9 +940,12 @@ key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, struct Key *to_key)
buffer_append(&to->certblob, buffer_ptr(&from->certblob),
buffer_len(&from->certblob));
- buffer_append(&to->constraints, buffer_ptr(&from->constraints),
- buffer_len(&from->constraints));
+ buffer_append(&to->critical,
+ buffer_ptr(&from->critical), buffer_len(&from->critical));
+ buffer_append(&to->extensions,
+ buffer_ptr(&from->extensions), buffer_len(&from->extensions));
+ to->serial = from->serial;
to->type = from->type;
to->key_id = from->key_id == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(from->key_id);
to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
@@ -940,6 +971,7 @@ key_from_private(const Key *k)
Key *n = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
n = key_new(k->type);
if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
@@ -950,6 +982,7 @@ key_from_private(const Key *k)
break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA1:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
n = key_new(k->type);
if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
@@ -979,8 +1012,12 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name)
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
return KEY_DSA;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
- return KEY_RSA_CERT;
+ return KEY_RSA_CERT_V00;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ return KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ return KEY_RSA_CERT;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) {
return KEY_DSA_CERT;
}
debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
@@ -1012,26 +1049,31 @@ key_names_valid2(const char *names)
static int
cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
{
- u_char *principals, *constraints, *sig_key, *sig;
- u_int signed_len, plen, clen, sklen, slen, kidlen;
+ u_char *principals, *critical, *exts, *sig_key, *sig;
+ u_int signed_len, plen, clen, sklen, slen, kidlen, elen;
Buffer tmp;
char *principal;
int ret = -1;
+ int v00 = key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 ||
+ key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00;
buffer_init(&tmp);
/* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
buffer_append(&key->cert->certblob, blob, blen);
- principals = constraints = sig_key = sig = NULL;
- if (buffer_get_int_ret(&key->cert->type, b) != 0 ||
+ elen = 0; /* Not touched for v00 certs */
+ principals = exts = critical = sig_key = sig = NULL;
+ if ((!v00 && buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->serial, b) != 0) ||
+ buffer_get_int_ret(&key->cert->type, b) != 0 ||
(key->cert->key_id = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &kidlen)) == NULL ||
(principals = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &plen)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_after, b) != 0 ||
buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_before, b) != 0 ||
- (constraints = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &clen)) == NULL ||
- /* skip nonce */ buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL ||
- /* skip reserved */ buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL ||
+ (critical = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &clen)) == NULL ||
+ (!v00 && (exts = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &elen)) == NULL) ||
+ (v00 && buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL) || /* nonce */
+ buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */
(sig_key = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &sklen)) == NULL) {
error("%s: parse error", __func__);
goto out;
@@ -1078,13 +1120,25 @@ cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
buffer_clear(&tmp);
- buffer_append(&key->cert->constraints, constraints, clen);
- buffer_append(&tmp, constraints, clen);
+ buffer_append(&key->cert->critical, critical, clen);
+ buffer_append(&tmp, critical, clen);
/* validate structure */
while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) {
if (buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL ||
buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) {
- error("%s: Constraints data invalid", __func__);
+ error("%s: critical option data invalid", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ buffer_clear(&tmp);
+
+ buffer_append(&key->cert->extensions, exts, elen);
+ buffer_append(&tmp, exts, elen);
+ /* validate structure */
+ while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) {
+ if (buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL ||
+ buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: extension data invalid", __func__);
goto out;
}
}
@@ -1121,8 +1175,10 @@ cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
buffer_free(&tmp);
if (principals != NULL)
xfree(principals);
- if (constraints != NULL)
- xfree(constraints);
+ if (critical != NULL)
+ xfree(critical);
+ if (exts != NULL)
+ xfree(exts);
if (sig_key != NULL)
xfree(sig_key);
if (sig != NULL)
@@ -1151,8 +1207,11 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
type = key_type_from_name(ktype);
switch (type) {
- case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
key = key_new(type);
if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 ||
buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) {
@@ -1166,8 +1225,11 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
#endif
break;
- case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
key = key_new(type);
if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 ||
buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 ||
@@ -1213,6 +1275,8 @@ key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
}
buffer_init(&b);
switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* Use the existing blob */
@@ -1255,9 +1319,11 @@ key_sign(
const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
@@ -1281,9 +1347,11 @@ key_verify(
return -1;
switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
@@ -1306,6 +1374,7 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
pk->rsa = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
key_cert_copy(k, pk);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
@@ -1318,6 +1387,7 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
key_cert_copy(k, pk);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
@@ -1344,8 +1414,17 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
int
key_is_cert(const Key *k)
{
- return k != NULL &&
- (k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT);
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
@@ -1353,8 +1432,10 @@ int
key_type_plain(int type)
{
switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return KEY_RSA;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return KEY_DSA;
default:
@@ -1364,16 +1445,16 @@ key_type_plain(int type)
/* Convert a KEY_RSA or KEY_DSA to their _CERT equivalent */
int
-key_to_certified(Key *k)
+key_to_certified(Key *k, int legacy)
{
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
k->cert = cert_new();
- k->type = KEY_RSA_CERT;
+ k->type = legacy ? KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_RSA_CERT;
return 0;
case KEY_DSA:
k->cert = cert_new();
- k->type = KEY_DSA_CERT;
+ k->type = legacy ? KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_DSA_CERT;
return 0;
default:
error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
@@ -1386,10 +1467,12 @@ int
key_drop_cert(Key *k)
{
switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
cert_free(k->cert);
k->type = KEY_RSA;
return 0;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
cert_free(k->cert);
k->type = KEY_DSA;
@@ -1430,13 +1513,21 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob);
buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, key_ssh_name(k));
+ /* -v01 certs put nonce first */
+ if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+ arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+ }
+
switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->p);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->q);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->g);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->pub_key);
break;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->e);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->n);
@@ -1448,6 +1539,10 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
return -1;
}
+ /* -v01 certs have a serial number next */
+ if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT)
+ buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->serial);
+
buffer_put_int(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->type);
buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->key_id);
@@ -1461,11 +1556,19 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_after);
buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_before);
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob,
- buffer_ptr(&k->cert->constraints),
- buffer_len(&k->cert->constraints));
+ buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical), buffer_len(&k->cert->critical));
+
+ /* -v01 certs have non-critical options here */
+ if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+ buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob,
+ buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions),
+ buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions));
+ }
+
+ /* -v00 certs put the nonce at the end */
+ if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00)
+ buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
- arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
- buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, NULL, 0); /* reserved */
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, ca_blob, ca_len);
xfree(ca_blob);
@@ -1536,3 +1639,15 @@ key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal,
}
return 0;
}
+
+int
+key_cert_is_legacy(Key *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/key.h b/key.h
index 4f17777c..11d30eae 100644
--- a/key.h
+++ b/key.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.29 2010/03/15 19:40:02 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.30 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ enum types {
KEY_DSA,
KEY_RSA_CERT,
KEY_DSA_CERT,
+ KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
+ KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
KEY_UNSPEC
};
enum fp_type {
@@ -56,11 +58,13 @@ enum fp_rep {
struct KeyCert {
Buffer certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
+ u_int64_t serial;
char *key_id;
u_int nprincipals;
char **principals;
u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before;
- Buffer constraints;
+ Buffer critical;
+ Buffer extensions;
Key *signature_key;
};
@@ -92,12 +96,13 @@ Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
int key_type_from_name(char *);
int key_is_cert(const Key *);
int key_type_plain(int);
-int key_to_certified(Key *);
+int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
int key_drop_cert(Key *);
int key_certify(Key *, Key *);
void key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *);
int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
const char **);
+int key_cert_is_legacy(Key *);
Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int);
int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *);
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
index 98f27fd1..7bedfab0 100644
--- a/myproposal.h
+++ b/myproposal.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.24 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.25 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@@ -40,9 +40,12 @@
"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
#endif
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
- "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
- "ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
+#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
+ "ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
index ad9f7a83..cba1078b 100644
--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.94 2010/03/01 11:07:06 otto Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.95 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, NULL)) != NULL) {
/* Graft with private bits */
- if (key_to_certified(private) != 0)
+ if (key_to_certified(private, key_cert_is_legacy(cert)) != 0)
fatal("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__);
key_cert_copy(cert, private);
key_free(cert);
diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
index b5c56527..2c0e2869 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.165 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.166 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->pub_key);
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->priv_key);
break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
cert = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &len);
if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
@@ -520,6 +521,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
/* Generate additional parameters */
rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
break;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
cert = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &len);
if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
@@ -540,6 +542,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
/* enable blinding */
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA1:
if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
index 449f493b..175e4d03 100644
--- a/ssh-dss.c
+++ b/ssh-dss.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.25 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.26 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -53,9 +53,8 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen;
Buffer b;
- if (key == NULL ||
- (key->type != KEY_DSA && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT) ||
- key->dsa == NULL) {
+ if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_DSA &&
+ key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT_V00)) {
error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key");
return -1;
}
@@ -118,9 +117,8 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
int rlen, ret;
Buffer b;
- if (key == NULL ||
- (key->type != KEY_DSA && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT) ||
- key->dsa == NULL) {
+ if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_DSA &&
+ key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT_V00)) {
error("ssh_dss_verify: no DSA key");
return -1;
}
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 3e03a9bd..aacd4d3d 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.92 2010/03/13 23:38:13 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.93 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" -*- nroff -*-
.\"
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 13 2010 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 16 2010 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -110,8 +110,9 @@
.Fl I Ar certificate_identity
.Op Fl h
.Op Fl n Ar principals
-.Op Fl O Ar constraint
+.Op Fl O Ar option
.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval
+.Op Fl z Ar serial_number
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl L
@@ -299,13 +300,13 @@ Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
-.It Fl O Ar constraint
-Specify a certificate constraint when signing a key.
+.It Fl O Ar option
+Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
This option may be specified multiple times.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
-The constraints that are valid for user certificates are:
+The options that are valid for user certificates are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ic clear
Clear all enabled permissions.
@@ -355,7 +356,7 @@ is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
format.
.El
.Pp
-At present, no constraints are valid for host keys.
+At present, no options are valid for host keys.
.It Fl P Ar passphrase
Provides the (old) passphrase.
.It Fl p
@@ -441,6 +442,10 @@ Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
.It Fl y
This option will read a private
OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+.It Fl z Ar serial_number
+Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
+this certificate from others from the same CA.
+The default serial number is zero.
.El
.Sh MODULI GENERATION
.Nm
@@ -501,7 +506,7 @@ that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for
user or host authentication.
Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or
-more principal (user or host) names and an optional set of constraints that
+more principal (user or host) names and an optional set of options that
are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key.
Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature
on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
@@ -541,11 +546,11 @@ To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals:
.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain user_key.pub"
.Pp
Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
-be specified through certificate constraints.
-A constrained certificate may disable features of the SSH session, may be
+be specified through certificate options..
+A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be
valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may
force the use of a specific command.
-For a list of valid certificate constraints, see the documentation for the
+For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the
.Fl O
option above.
.Pp
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 37e516ff..8938dc05 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.185 2010/03/15 19:40:02 stevesk Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.186 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -105,6 +105,9 @@ char *identity_comment = NULL;
/* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */
char *ca_key_path = NULL;
+/* Certificate serial number */
+long long cert_serial = 0;
+
/* Key type when certifying */
u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
@@ -118,18 +121,18 @@ char *cert_principals = NULL;
u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
-/* Certificate constraints */
-#define CONSTRAINT_X_FWD (1)
-#define CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
-#define CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
-#define CONSTRAINT_PTY (1<<3)
-#define CONSTRAINT_USER_RC (1<<4)
-#define CONSTRAINT_DEFAULT (CONSTRAINT_X_FWD|CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD| \
- CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD|CONSTRAINT_PTY| \
- CONSTRAINT_USER_RC)
-u_int32_t constraint_flags = CONSTRAINT_DEFAULT;
-char *constraint_command = NULL;
-char *constraint_src_addr = NULL;
+/* Certificate options */
+#define CRITOPT_X_FWD (1)
+#define CRITOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
+#define CRITOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
+#define CRITOPT_PTY (1<<3)
+#define CRITOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
+#define CRITOPT_DEFAULT (CRITOPT_X_FWD|CRITOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
+ CRITOPT_PORT_FWD|CRITOPT_PTY| \
+ CRITOPT_USER_RC)
+u_int32_t critical_flags = CRITOPT_DEFAULT;
+char *critical_command = NULL;
+char *critical_src_addr = NULL;
/* Dump public key file in format used by real and the original SSH 2 */
int convert_to_ssh2 = 0;
@@ -161,9 +164,13 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
case KEY_RSA1:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY;
break;
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
break;
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
break;
@@ -1104,7 +1111,7 @@ fmt_validity(u_int64_t valid_from, u_int64_t valid_to)
}
static void
-add_flag_constraint(Buffer *c, const char *name)
+add_flag_option(Buffer *c, const char *name)
{
debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name);
buffer_put_cstring(c, name);
@@ -1112,7 +1119,7 @@ add_flag_constraint(Buffer *c, const char *name)
}
static void
-add_string_constraint(Buffer *c, const char *name, const char *value)
+add_string_option(Buffer *c, const char *name, const char *value)
{
Buffer b;
@@ -1127,24 +1134,23 @@ add_string_constraint(Buffer *c, const char *name, const char *value)
}
static void
-prepare_constraint_buf(Buffer *c)
+prepare_options_buf(Buffer *c)
{
-
buffer_clear(c);
- if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_X_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-X11-forwarding");
- if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-agent-forwarding");
- if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
- add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-port-forwarding");
- if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_PTY) != 0)
- add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-pty");
- if ((constraint_flags & CONSTRAINT_USER_RC) != 0)
- add_flag_constraint(c, "permit-user-rc");
- if (constraint_command != NULL)
- add_string_constraint(c, "force-command", constraint_command);
- if (constraint_src_addr != NULL)
- add_string_constraint(c, "source-address", constraint_src_addr);
+ if ((critical_flags & CRITOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding");
+ if ((critical_flags & CRITOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding");
+ if ((critical_flags & CRITOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding");
+ if ((critical_flags & CRITOPT_PTY) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty");
+ if ((critical_flags & CRITOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc");
+ if (critical_command != NULL)
+ add_string_option(c, "force-command", critical_command);
+ if (critical_src_addr != NULL)
+ add_string_option(c, "source-address", critical_src_addr);
}
static void
@@ -1155,12 +1161,32 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
Key *ca, *public;
char *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL;
FILE *f;
+ int v00 = 0; /* legacy keys */
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
if ((ca = load_identity(tmp)) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't load CA key \"%s\"", tmp);
xfree(tmp);
+ if (key_type_name != NULL) {
+ switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ v00 = 1;
+ break;
+ case KEY_UNSPEC:
+ if (strcasecmp(key_type_name, "v00") == 0) {
+ v00 = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(key_type_name, "v01") == 0)
+ break;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
/* Split list of principals */
n = 0;
@@ -1183,15 +1209,16 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
__func__, tmp, key_type(public));
/* Prepare certificate to sign */
- if (key_to_certified(public) != 0)
+ if (key_to_certified(public, v00) != 0)
fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp);
public->cert->type = cert_key_type;
+ public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial;
public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id);
public->cert->nprincipals = n;
public->cert->principals = plist;
public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from;
public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to;
- prepare_constraint_buf(&public->cert->constraints);
+ prepare_options_buf(&public->cert->critical);
public->cert->signature_key = key_from_private(ca);
if (key_certify(public, ca) != 0)
@@ -1212,13 +1239,14 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
fclose(f);
- if (!quiet)
- logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\"%s%s valid %s",
- cert_key_type == SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER?"user":"host",
- out, cert_key_id,
+ if (!quiet) {
+ logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s "
+ "valid %s", key_cert_type(public),
+ out, public->cert->key_id, public->cert->serial,
cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "",
cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "",
fmt_validity(cert_valid_from, cert_valid_to));
+ }
key_free(public);
xfree(out);
@@ -1321,50 +1349,50 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
}
static void
-add_cert_constraint(char *opt)
+add_cert_option(char *opt)
{
char *val;
if (strcmp(opt, "clear") == 0)
- constraint_flags = 0;
+ critical_flags = 0;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0)
- constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_X_FWD;
+ critical_flags &= ~CRITOPT_X_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0)
- constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_X_FWD;
+ critical_flags |= CRITOPT_X_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0)
- constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD;
+ critical_flags &= ~CRITOPT_AGENT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
- constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_AGENT_FWD;
+ critical_flags |= CRITOPT_AGENT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0)
- constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD;
+ critical_flags &= ~CRITOPT_PORT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
- constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_PORT_FWD;
+ critical_flags |= CRITOPT_PORT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0)
- constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_PTY;
+ critical_flags &= ~CRITOPT_PTY;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0)
- constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_PTY;
+ critical_flags |= CRITOPT_PTY;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0)
- constraint_flags &= ~CONSTRAINT_USER_RC;
+ critical_flags &= ~CRITOPT_USER_RC;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
- constraint_flags |= CONSTRAINT_USER_RC;
+ critical_flags |= CRITOPT_USER_RC;
else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
val = opt + 14;
if (*val == '\0')
- fatal("Empty force-command constraint");
- if (constraint_command != NULL)
+ fatal("Empty force-command option");
+ if (critical_command != NULL)
fatal("force-command already specified");
- constraint_command = xstrdup(val);
+ critical_command = xstrdup(val);
} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) {
val = opt + 15;
if (*val == '\0')
- fatal("Empty source-address constraint");
- if (constraint_src_addr != NULL)
+ fatal("Empty source-address option");
+ if (critical_src_addr != NULL)
fatal("source-address already specified");
if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0)
fatal("Invalid source-address list");
- constraint_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
+ critical_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
} else
- fatal("Unsupported certificate constraint \"%s\"", opt);
+ fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt);
}
static void
@@ -1373,9 +1401,9 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
Key *key;
struct stat st;
char *key_fp, *ca_fp;
- Buffer constraints, constraint;
+ Buffer options, option;
u_char *name, *data;
- u_int i, dlen;
+ u_int i, dlen, v00;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
@@ -1387,17 +1415,21 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
fatal("%s is not a public key", identity_file);
if (!key_is_cert(key))
fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file);
-
+ v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
+
key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
printf("%s:\n", identity_file);
- printf(" %s %s certificate %s\n", key_type(key),
- key_cert_type(key), key_fp);
- printf(" Signed by %s CA %s\n",
+ printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key),
+ key_cert_type(key));
+ printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp);
+ printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n",
key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp);
- printf(" Key ID \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
+ printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
+ if (!v00)
+ printf(" Serial: %llu\n", key->cert->serial);
printf(" Valid: %s\n",
fmt_validity(key->cert->valid_after, key->cert->valid_before));
printf(" Principals: ");
@@ -1409,20 +1441,20 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
key->cert->principals[i]);
printf("\n");
}
- printf(" Constraints: ");
- if (buffer_len(&key->cert->constraints) == 0)
+ printf(" Critical Options: ");
+ if (buffer_len(&key->cert->critical) == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
printf("\n");
- buffer_init(&constraints);
- buffer_append(&constraints,
- buffer_ptr(&key->cert->constraints),
- buffer_len(&key->cert->constraints));
- buffer_init(&constraint);
- while (buffer_len(&constraints) != 0) {
- name = buffer_get_string(&constraints, NULL);
- data = buffer_get_string_ptr(&constraints, &dlen);
- buffer_append(&constraint, data, dlen);
+ buffer_init(&options);
+ buffer_append(&options,
+ buffer_ptr(&key->cert->critical),
+ buffer_len(&key->cert->critical));
+ buffer_init(&option);
+ while (buffer_len(&options) != 0) {
+ name = buffer_get_string(&options, NULL);
+ data = buffer_get_string_ptr(&options, &dlen);
+ buffer_append(&option, data, dlen);
printf(" %s", name);
if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
@@ -1432,22 +1464,43 @@ do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
printf("\n");
else if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
- data = buffer_get_string(&constraint, NULL);
+ data = buffer_get_string(&option, NULL);
printf(" %s\n", data);
xfree(data);
} else {
- printf(" UNKNOWN CONSTRAINT (len %u)\n",
- buffer_len(&constraint));
- buffer_clear(&constraint);
+ printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %u)\n",
+ buffer_len(&option));
+ buffer_clear(&option);
}
xfree(name);
- if (buffer_len(&constraint) != 0)
- fatal("Constraint corrupt: extra data at end");
+ if (buffer_len(&option) != 0)
+ fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end");
+ }
+ buffer_free(&option);
+ buffer_free(&options);
+ }
+ if (!v00) {
+ printf(" Extensions: ");
+ if (buffer_len(&key->cert->extensions) == 0)
+ printf("(none)\n");
+ else {
+ printf("\n");
+ buffer_init(&options);
+ buffer_append(&options,
+ buffer_ptr(&key->cert->extensions),
+ buffer_len(&key->cert->extensions));
+ buffer_init(&option);
+ while (buffer_len(&options) != 0) {
+ name = buffer_get_string(&options, NULL);
+ (void)buffer_get_string_ptr(&options, &dlen);
+ printf(" %s UNKNOWN OPTION "
+ "(len %u)\n", name, dlen);
+ xfree(name);
+ }
+ buffer_free(&option);
+ buffer_free(&options);
}
- buffer_free(&constraint);
- buffer_free(&constraints);
}
-
exit(0);
}
@@ -1478,7 +1531,7 @@ usage(void)
fprintf(stderr, " -M memory Amount of memory (MB) to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -n name,... User/host principal names to include in certificate\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -N phrase Provide new passphrase.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -O cnstr Specify a certificate constraint.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, " -O cnstr Specify a certificate option.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -P phrase Provide old passphrase.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -p Change passphrase of private key file.\n");
fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet.\n");
@@ -1541,7 +1594,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "degiqpclBHLhvxXyF:b:f:t:D:I:P:N:n:"
- "O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:")) != -1) {
+ "O:C:r:g:R:T:G:M:S:s:a:V:W:z:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'b':
bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 768, 32768, &errstr);
@@ -1597,7 +1650,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
break;
case 'O':
- add_cert_constraint(optarg);
+ add_cert_option(optarg);
break;
case 'C':
identity_comment = optarg;
@@ -1612,7 +1665,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
break;
case 'h':
cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
- constraint_flags = 0;
+ critical_flags = 0;
break;
case 'i':
case 'X':
@@ -1661,9 +1714,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
break;
case 'M':
memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
- if (errstr) {
+ if (errstr)
fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
- }
break;
case 'G':
do_gen_candidates = 1;
@@ -1685,6 +1737,11 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
case 'V':
parse_cert_times(optarg);
break;
+ case 'z':
+ cert_serial = strtonum(optarg, 0, LLONG_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr)
+ fatal("Invalid serial number: %s", errstr);
+ break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
index 842857fe..bb9cc8e2 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.40 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.41 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
@@ -46,9 +46,8 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
int ok, nid;
Buffer b;
- if (key == NULL ||
- (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
- key->rsa == NULL) {
+ if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_RSA &&
+ key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT_V00)) {
error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key");
return -1;
}
@@ -115,9 +114,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
u_int len, dlen, modlen;
int rlen, ret, nid;
- if (key == NULL ||
- (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
- key->rsa == NULL) {
+ if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_RSA &&
+ key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT_V00)) {
error("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key");
return -1;
}
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index ca83bc79..3c8b8c7c 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.222 2010/04/14 22:27:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.223 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -586,9 +586,9 @@ check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key)
error("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
- if (buffer_len(&host_key->cert->constraints) != 0) {
- error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported constraint(s)",
- host);
+ if (buffer_len(&host_key->cert->critical) != 0) {
+ error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
+ "critical options(s)", host);
return 0;
}
return 1;
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 25a3323f..e146a4b2 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.181 2010/04/10 02:10:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.182 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@@ -1140,8 +1140,11 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
u_int skip = 0;
int ret = -1;
int have_sig = 1;
+ char *fp;
- debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey");
+ fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
+ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
+ xfree(fp);
if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
/* we cannot handle this key */
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index bc0d2753..a7d3ee5c 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.374 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.375 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -744,6 +744,8 @@ list_hostkey_types(void)
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
@@ -767,10 +769,17 @@ get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int need_private)
Key *key;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
- if (type == KEY_RSA_CERT || type == KEY_DSA_CERT)
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
- else
+ break;
+ default:
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+ break;
+ }
if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
return need_private ?
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;